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This paper examines the inflation targeting experience in three transition countries: the Czech
Republic, Poland and Hungary. While the examined countries have missed inflation targets often by
a large margin, they nevertheless progressed well with disinflation. A key lesson from the experience
of the inflation targeting transition countries is that economic performance will improve and support
for the central bank will be higher if the central banks emphasize avoiding undershoots of the inflation
target as much as avoiding overshoots. Also economic performance will be enhanced if inflation
targeting central banks in transition countries do not engage in active manipulation of the exchange
rate. The relationship between the central bank and the government in these countries has been quite
difficult, but this can be alleviated by having a direct government involvement in the setting of the
inflation target and with a more active role of the central bank in communicating with both the
government and the public. In addition having technocrats appointed as the head of the central bank
rather than politicians may help in depersonalizing the conduct of monetary policy and increase
support for the independence of the central bank. The paper also addresses the future perspective of
monetary policy in the transition economies and concludes that even after the EU accession, inflation
targeting can remain the main pillar of monetary strategy in the three examined accession countries
during the time before they will join the EMU.
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In the second half of the 1990s, several transition countries have abandoned fixed 
exchange rate regimes, and instead introduced inflation targeting as framework for the 
conduct of monetary policy. In this paper, we will analyses the experience of three countries 
that moved to an inflation targeting regime: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  
 
It is worth studying inflation targeting in these transition countries for two reasons.  
First, the transition countries are becoming an important part of Europe and designing the 
right monetary policy regime for their transition to successful European economies is 
valuable in its own right.  Second, these countries have three unique features that make the 
study of inflation targeting in these countries particularly interesting:  1) they are new 
democracies that are in the process of developing new governmental institutions; 2) their 
economies are undergoing radical restructuring as part of the transition from communism  to 
capitalism; and 3) they are very likely to enter the European Union (EU) and Economic and  
Monetary Union (EMU) in the near future.  These three unique features are emphasized in 
our discussion of their inflation targeting regimes. 
 
  In the next section of the paper we discuss the reasons why these countries moved to 
a more flexible exchange rate regime and for the introduction of inflation targeting. In the 
third section, we examine in more detail the introduction of inflation targeting in the three 
countries, and in the fourth section, we evaluate the preliminary experience with inflation 
targeting. In the fifth section, we discuss a number of specific issues for inflation targeting in 
transition economies: what inflation measure to target, whether to target a point or a range, 
what should be the time horizon for the inflation target, who should set the inflation target,  
what should be the response to faster than targeted disinflation, how monetary policy should 
respond to deviations of inflation from the target, how much should the floor of the inflation 
target be emphasized relative to the ceiling, and what role should the exchange rate play in an 
inflation targeting regime.  In section 6, we discuss the future prospects of inflation targeting 
in transition economies in connection with the planned entry into EMU, focusing on inflation 
targeting within the fluctuation band of ERM2 regime and on the potential conflict between 




2. From peg to float 
 
  In economic history books,  the 1990s will be probably remembered as a decade 
when fixed exchange rate regimes lost much of their attraction as nominal anchors for the 
conduct of monetary policy. As a result of devastating financial crises, many emerging 
market countries were forced to abandon fixed exchange rate regimes, and replace them with 
more flexible exchange rate arrangements. Some countries – though a significant minority – 
even opted to introduce more flexible exchange rate regime in an orderly way, without being 
forced to exit the peg as a result of financial crisis or market pressure on their currency.    
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  This trend from a more fixed to more flexible exchange rate regimes was also 
observed in transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. In the early years of 
transition, in the aftermath of price liberalization and exchange rate devaluation, many 
transition economies have used the exchange rate peg as a nominal anchor to achieve a rapid 
stabilization of price level. However, as with other emerging market economies, transition 
economies too have suffered the standard problem of exchange rate-based stabilization 
programs: while inflation did decline significantly, it did not decline enough to prevent a 
large real appreciation that ultimately created a balance of payment problems and forced the 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate. While some countries opted for a hard version of a 
fixed exchange rate – a currency board arrangement, others introduced managed float: first 
the Czech Republic in 1997, then the Slovak Republic and Poland in 1998. Hungary did not 
move to a full floating currency regime, but in May 2001, it introduced an exchange rate 
band, allowing the currency to move up and down within this band by 15 percent.  
 
When abandoning the exchange rate pegs, the authorities of these countries had to 
decide what nominal anchor to use instead of the fixed exchange rate. While the Slovak 
Republic did not accompany the move to a floating exchange rate by an explicit introduction 
of new monetary policy framework, the other three countries opted for inflation targeting. 
Why did the authorities in these countries opted for inflation targeting, and why did they 
reject other alternative policy frameworks?  We can see why by examining the problems of 
other monetary policy regimes. 
 
        One alternative would be to use monetary aggregates as an intermediate target and 
nominal anchor. However, targeting monetary aggregates does not have much attraction in 
transition economies.
1 The traditional problem of instability of money demand, and therefore 
the unstable relationship between the growth of money supply and inflation, could be a 
particularly serious obstacle to targeting monetary aggregates in transition economies. 
Economic transition is characterized by a sequence of price shocks, including corrections in 
administered prices and tax reforms, that make the relationship between money supply and 
price level very difficult to predict. The instability of money demand and money-price 
relationship is further exacerbated by far-reaching changes in financial sector, including deep 
institutional changes, emergence of  new types of financial assets and players etc. Therefore, 
relying solely on targeting money supply growth could be a quite ineffective approach to 
conducting monetary policy.  
 
Transition economies could have also applied a discretionary, “just-do-it” approach to 
monetary policy as the Federal Reserve in the United States is doing, in which there is no 
                                                 
1 Indeed, it is not at all clear that monetary targeting is a viable strategy, even in 
industrialized countries, because the relationship between monetary aggregates and goal 
variables such as inflation and nominal spending is typically quite weak.  For example, see 
Estrella and Mishkin (1997).    
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explicit nominal anchor.
2  Given the difficulty of establishing a more stable relationship 
between some intermediate target and price level, some may think that a less formal 
approach to monetary policy would be advisable. However, while this approach may work in 
countries whose central bank has well-established anti-inflationary credibility, and where 
inflation is low, it was doubtful that it would work well in transition economies. Particularly 
in the Czech Republic where inflation was relatively high and rising after the fixed exchange 
rate regime was abandoned, the just-do-it approach to monetary policy was not seen as being 
potentially effective in bringing inflation expectations and actual inflation down. Without 
anti-inflation credibility, the just-do-it approach would not sufficiently anchor inflation 
expectations and persuade economic agents that monetary policy would be actually 
conducted to control inflation.  
 
A third option would be to replace a fixed exchange rate regime with a harder variant 
of exchange rate peg, that is, by introducing a currency board, or even unilaterally euroizing.  
This option has the advantage that it provides a nominal anchor that helps keep inflation 
under control by tying the prices of domestically-produced tradable goods to those in the 
anchor country, and making inflation expectations converge to those prevailing in the anchor 
country.  In addition, it provides an automatic adjustment mechanism that helps mitigate the 
time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy.   Hard pegs also have the advantage of 
simplicity and clarity, which make them easily understood by the public.  However, the hard 
peg option has the disadvantage that it leaves little scope for the country to conduct its own 
monetary policy in order to react to domestic or foreign shocks. 
  
  For transition countries that wanted to retain some control over domestic monetary 
policy and so opted to keep a flexible exchange rate, the problems with monetary targeting 
and the just-do-it approach led them to adopt a fourth option, inflation targeting.  Inflation 
targeting has several advantages over a hard peg, monetary targeting or the just-do-it 
approach.  In contrast to a hard peg, inflation targeting enables monetary policy to focus on 
domestic considerations and to respond to shocks of both domestic and foreign origin. 
Inflation targeting also has the advantage that stability in the relationship between money and 
inflation is not critical to its success because it does not depend on such a relationship.  
Inflation targeting, like a hard peg, also has the key advantage that it is easily understood by 
the public and thus highly transparent.  In contrast, monetary targets, although visible, are 
less likely to be well understood by the public, especially as the relationship between 
monetary aggregates and inflation becomes less stable and reliable.  Because an explicit 
numerical target for inflation increases the accountability of the central bank relative to a 
                                                 
2 For a description of the just-do-it approach in the United States, see Bernanke et al. (1999). 
Some transition economies are pursuing a managed float (Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia) or free float (Albania) without a formal inflation targeting framework in place, 
though Albania is now introducing full-fledged inflation targeting. It is interesting to 
compare the development of inflation in these countries that have similarly flexible exchange 
rate regimes but no formal inflation targeting regime in place (see section IV.c.).   
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discretionary regime, inflation targeting also has the potential to reduce the likelihood that 
the central bank will fall into the time-inconsistency trap.  Moreover, since the source of 
time-inconsistency is often found in (covert or open) political pressures on the central bank to 
engage in expansionary monetary policy, inflation targeting has the advantage of focusing 
the political debate on what a central bank can do on a sustainable basis--i.e., control 
inflation--rather on than what it cannot do through monetary policy--e.g., raise output 
growth, lower unemployment, or increase external competitiveness. 
 
How well were the transition economies prepared for the introduction of inflation 
targeting? In the literature, a relatively long list of requirements has been identified that 
countries should meet if inflation targeting regime is to operate successfully.
3 These 
requirements include: (1) a strong fiscal position; (2) a well understood transmission 
mechanisms between monetary policy instruments and inflation; (3) a well-developed 
financial system; (4) central bank independence and a clear mandate for price stability; (5) a 
reasonably well-developed ability to forecast inflation; (6) absence of other nominal anchors 
than inflation; and (7) transparent and accountable monetary policy. 
 
  It is not possible to say whether a country meets these requirements or not: it is more 
a question of degree to which these preconditions are met. On the whole, it could be argued 
that the three transition countries that adopted inflation targeting, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, met these requirements to a sufficient degree to make inflation 
targeting feasible and useful.
4 
 
All three countries have an independent central bank with a clear mandate to pursue  
price stability.  In some cases, this independence and price stability mandate has been 
strengthened just before the introduction of inflation targeting. There has been also 
significant progress in making monetary policy decisions more transparent and central banks 
more accountable, though this is still to some extent a work in progress in some countries. 
Financial markets in the three analyzed economies are relatively well developed, allowing for 
a reasonably effective transmission mechanism between monetary policy instruments and 
inflation.  
 
With respect to fiscal position, partly as a result of explicit recognition of hidden 
transformation-related costs, fiscal deficits have widened significantly, particularly in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (see table 1).  However, these deficits have not yet posed a 
direct problem to inflation targeting in the sense of fiscal dominance of monetary policy, 
                                                 
3 See Debelle (1997) and Schaechter et. al. (2000). 
4 For discussion of whether Hungary is ready for inflation targeting, see Siklos and Ábel 
(2001).    
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because they have been financed by non-monetary means at relatively favorable terms.
5 The 
main reason why large fiscal deficits in accession countries do not trigger adverse market 
reaction is that they are widely considered to be temporary. Partly, this reflects the 
recognition of implicit public sector liabilities from the past. Moreover, as a result of 
EU/EMU accession, these countries will adopt an institutional framework (Stability and 
Growth Pact, SGP) that will require them to pursue disciplined fiscal policies. Still, before 
the constraint of the SGP begins to operate, large fiscal deficits can complicate monetary 
policy conduct in indirect ways as we will see in our later discussion of these three countries 
experience with inflation targeting. 
 
Table 1. Inflation-targeting countries: general government balance (in % of GDP) 1/ 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Czech  Republic  -2.4 -2.0 -4.2 -5.2 
Hungary  -4.8 -3.4 -3.3 -4.7 
Poland  -3.2 -3.7 -3.2 -6.0 
  
1/ Excludes privatization revenues 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2002) 
 
As for the absence of multiple nominal anchors, this condition is clearly met in the 
Czech Republic and Poland. These countries have in place a regime of managed float, and 
inflation is the only nominal anchor in the economy. In Hungary, the situation is more 
complicated, because of the presence of the exchange rate band. Theoretically, this could be 
incompatible with the requirement of the single nominal anchor if the band is too narrow.  
We should note that the existence of the exchange rate fluctuation band is is not only an issue 
of concern to Hungary today, but it will be of concern to all transition countries that would 
join the ERM2 system, when they will have to put in place the same fluctuation band. We 
will discuss the issue of fluctuation band and inflation targeting in the section on monetary 
policy within the ERM2 system. 
 
Perhaps the most serious objection raised against the adoption of inflation targeting in 
transition economies is the limited ability to forecast accurately inflation. This is partly the 
result of the relatively frequent occurrence of shocks to which transition economies are 
exposed, including price deregulation and catching up with the more advanced economies, 
and also the result of relatively large degree of openness of these economies. Actual inflation 
is relatively unstable relative to the long-term inflation trend (Orlowski, 2000).  Under such 
circumstances, there are natural limits to central banks’ ability to forecast inflation that 
cannot be quickly and substantially improved by more sophisticated forecasting models. 
                                                 
5 Note that one can argue that a strong fiscal position is a requirement for successful conduct 
of monetary policy under any policy framework, not just inflation targeting. See Eichengreen 
(1999) and Mishkin and Savastano (1999).   
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However, inflation-targeting central banks are nevertheless making progress in improving 
their inflation-forecasting capacity. One approach is to use alternative and less formal 
methods of gauging future inflation. For example, in 1999, the Czech National Bank has 
introduced a survey of inflation forecasts by market participants to measure inflation 
expectations.   
 
3. Introduction of inflation targeting in individual countries 
 
We will now turn in more detail to the introduction of inflation targeting in individual 
countries. We will briefly examine economic developments preceding the introduction of 
inflation targeting, and the main operational characteristics of the inflation targeting regimes 
in the three countries.  
 
3.a. Czech Republic 
 
  The Czech Republic was the first transition economy that introduced an inflation 
targeting regime, after it has abandoned fixed exchange rate regime following currency 
turbulence in May 1997. 
 
  A fixed exchange rate regime played an important role in the macroeconomic 
stabilization package introduced in 1991. Several months after liberalization of prices  and 
devaluation of currency in 1991, the rate of inflation has come down quickly, though  not 
quite to levels prevailing in advanced economies. Inflation remained stuck at around 10 
percent, and wages and other nominal variables soon adjusted to this level. Higher domestic 
inflation and the fixed nominal exchange rate produced a real appreciation which was not 
fully validated by higher productivity growth, and after some time, erosion of 
competitiveness became a concern. The economy began to overheat, political constraints 
prevented a sufficiently vigorous and flexible use of fiscal policy to mitigate imbalances in 
nonpublic sector, and tightening of monetary policy alone could not cope with these rapidly 
growing imbalances. The mix of tighter monetary and continued loose fiscal policy may have 
only made things worse: it contributed to higher interest rates which attracted more short-
term foreign capital, fueling further the growth of liquidity, keeping inflation high and 
widening the current account deficit.  
 
  Ultimately, as the external deficit continued to widen despite the visible deceleration 
of economic growth later in 1996, the situation became unsustainable. It became increasingly 
obvious that policy adjustment that was feasible under the existing political constraints would 
fall short of what was needed to reverse the unsustainable deterioration of current account 
position. Uncertainties in financial markets, triggered initially by speculative attacks on the 
Thai baht, only accelerated the flight of foreign investors from koruna assets which forced   
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the authorities to stop defending a fixed exchange rate. On May 26, 1997, the government 
and the Czech National Bank (CNB) decided to allow the koruna to float freely.
 6 
 
  Like many other emerging market countries, the Czech Republic did not exit the peg 
at a time of strong external position, but only when it was forced to do so by market pressure. 
However, unlike other central banks that were ultimately forced to abandon the defense of a 
fixed parity, the CNB did not wait too long after the pressure on the koruna intensified. Even 
though it first tried to fend off the pressure by raising interest rates, it did not waste a large 
amount of foreign reserves in foreign exchange market intervention. In the week before the 
decision to float, CNB’s foreign reserves declined by about $ 2.5 billion, to $10 billion. 
Given the unsatisfactory experience with interventions as a tool to prevent the exit from a 
pegged exchange rate regime, this was a correct decision. 
 
  Possible inflationary effects of currency depreciation after the exit from the peg, 
together with the absence of alternative nominal anchor to guide inflation expectations, 
created a risk that inflation would increase significantly in the coming months. Therefore, the 
CNB began to work on a new monetary policy framework, and in the meantime, it tried to 
guide inflation expectations by its public pronouncements. After the koruna was allowed to 
float, the CNB issued a public statement that it expected the average koruna exchange rate 
will stabilize within months at roughly CZK 17 to 19.50 per 1 DEM (Czech National Bank, 
1997). Furthermore, the CNB made it clear that in the future, monetary policy would  be 
unambiguously focused on domestic price level stability and reduction of potential 
inflationary effects of the koruna’s exchange rate movements (Czech National Bank, 1997).  
The first sentence may seem to have been somewhat at odds with the managed float. The 
reason for announcing a band in which the CNB expected the CZK/DM exchange rate to 
settle was to prevent overshooting at a time when there was no other nominal anchor to tie 
down exchange rate and inflation expectations, and to limit to the extent possible any pass-
through of currency depreciation to domestic inflation.  
 
  However, the CNB felt that this approach to monetary policy conduct was not 
satisfactory and could not continue for much longer. Therefore, on December 21, the CNB 
Bank Board decided that in the future, monetary programs would be formulated on basis of 
inflation targeting. The stated purpose of inflation targeting was to provide a nominal anchor 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the Czech exchange rate crisis see Begg (1998). It is noteworthy that 
unlike many other emerging market countries that were forced to abandon the currency peg, 
the Czech koruna depreciated only moderately, and subsequently strengthened again. One 
reason for this limited depreciation was the relatively low degree of dollarization and 
currency mismatches in the Czech economy and thus the limited effect of the exit from the 
peg on companies’ and banks’ balance sheets.   
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in the form of an inflation target, to use monetary policy tools directly to achieve the inflation 
target, and regularly inform the public about the conduct of monetary policy.
7 
 
  In deciding what measure of inflation to target, the CNB faced a trade-off between 
transparency and the ability to control inflation, an issue that we will look at in detail later. 
The CNB opted for a compromise that it considered most appropriate for an economy in 
transition. For the purpose of inflation targeting, it introduced a new concept, so-called net 
inflation. Net inflation measures changes in the consumer price index  (CPI), excluding the 
movement in regulated prices and is further adjusted for the impact on the remaining items of 
changes in indirect taxes or subsidy elimination.
8 Unlike many other inflation-targeting 
countries, the CNB did not exclude from net inflation changes in prices of energy and 
agriculture products. Such an exclusion would have narrowed the targeted price index too 
much, and would make it too detached from the headline inflation. Instead, the CNB 
subsequently introduced the so-called “exceptions” to deal with this problem (see below).  
 
  In choosing whether to target a range or a single numerical value of inflation, the 
CNB opted for a range. Initially, in 1998 and 1999, it was targeting a band 1 percentage point 
wide, but from 2000, it widened the band to 2 percentage points. The CNB’s decision about 
the width of the band was guided mainly by its assessment of the accuracy with which it 
thought it could hit net inflation targets, as well as the past volatility of net inflation. 
 
  At the end of 1998, the CNB made some modifications of its inflation targeting 
strategy.  First, the CNB introduced the “exceptions” that could justify missing an inflation 
target. Exceptions refer to exceptional and unpredictable factors which cause that actual 
inflation deviates from inflation target, and for which the CNB cannot bear responsibility. 
These factors are: significant differences between actual and predicted world prices of 
commodities; significant differences between actual and predicted exchange rate that do not 
reflect developments of domestic economic fundamentals and monetary policy; significant 
changes of conditions in agriculture which affect agriculture producer prices; and natural 
disasters and other extraordinary events that produce demand-led and cost-pushed price 
shocks (Czech National Bank, 1999, p. 57).  
 
  Second, the CNB decided to take a more active role in affecting inflation 
expectations. It realized that a much more rapid than originally expected decline in inflation 
in the second half of 1998, together with large degree of rigidity in nominal variables, could 
                                                 
7 The path to inflation targeting for the CNB has many similarities to the path followed by 
the Bank of England and the Riksbank after  the collapse of their exchange rate pegs in 1992.  
See Bernanke et al. (1999). 
8 At the end of 1997, CPI consisted of 754 items, 91 items had regulated price, and net 
inflation measured movements of 663 items, which in terms of weighs in consumer basket 
represented about 4/5 of total basket.    
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produce undesirable developments in real variables, most importantly, real wages. The CNB  
therefore initiated an informative meeting with the representatives of trade unions and 




  In December 1999, the CNB approved Long-term Monetary Strategy which specified 
long-term inflation target for 2005. The objective was to make the inflation targeting strategy 
more forward-looking. Importantly, the CNB made an effort to involve the public and the 
government in discussion of the long-term monetary policy target. No doubt, this outreach 
effort reflected the criticism by some politicians that the process of disinflation was too fast 
and too costly in 1998 and 1999. The CNB did not wish to announce the quantified long-term 
target corresponding to price stability and the speed with which this ultimate objective is to 
be achieved, without acquiring the support of the government. The CNB seems to have 
acknowledged implicitly that the decision on the speed of disinflation is ultimately a political 
one, and that it had to be taken by a body with political mandate. 
 
  Another modification of inflation targeting framework took place in April 2001. At 
that time, the CNB decided that the main reasons for favoring net inflation targeting rather 
than headline inflation targeting had disappeared, and it decided that from 2002 on, it would 
target headline inflation measured by the consumer price index.
10 The CNB explained that 
headline inflation covers more comprehensively price developments in the economy, and that 
it is more relevant for decisions of economic agents. For these reasons, by targeting headline 
inflation, monetary policy should also be better able to affect inflation expectations. Headline 
inflation targets for the period 2002-2005 were derived from the trajectory of net inflation 
specified in the December 1999 Long-term Monetary Strategy. The CNB realized that 
targeting headline inflation has its risks as well, the most important one being the uncertainty 
regarding the development of regulated prices and effects of changes in administered prices. 
For example, the need to achieve a stronger adjustment of fiscal imbalances could require 
larger than expected increase in administered prices, with consequently larger impact on 
headline inflation. Another complication could arise from the harmonization of indirect taxes 
with the EU ahead of the EU entry. But these unexpected effects of changes in regulated 
                                                 
9 Trade unions agreed that it would not be desirable to aim for higher than zero growth in real 
wages in 1999. The catch was that trade unions’ economic experts projected that inflation in 
1999 would reach 10 percent, and trade unions therefore demanded a 10 percent increase in 
nominal wages which in their view would be consistent with zero growth in real wages. As 
inflation in 1999 remained close to 2 percent, 10 percent nominal wage growth resulted in a 
large increase in real wages. At the end of 1999, when the CNB was again discussing with 
the representatives of trade unions inflation prospects for 2000, they seem to have learned 
from their mistake and expressed more trust in CNB’s inflation forecast for 2000. 
10 However, already in 2000, when it announced net inflation target for end-2001, the CNB 
also began publishing its projection of headline inflation.   
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prices or administrative measures on headline inflation were included in the exceptions that 
allow actual inflation to deviate from inflation target without necessitating a monetary policy 
response. After the April 2001 modification, the list of the exceptions included: 
•  major deviations in world prices of raw materials, energy-producing materials and 
other commodities;  
•  major deviations of the koruna's exchange rate that are not connected with domestic 
economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy;  
•  major changes in the conditions for agricultural production having an impact on 
agricultural producer prices;  
•  natural disasters and other extraordinary events having cost and demand impacts on 
prices;  
•  changes in regulated prices whose effects on headline inflation would exceed 1-1.5 
percentage points;  
•  step changes in indirect taxes 
  The CNB has also announced that the list of exceptions could be further widened in 




  After the Czech Republic, Poland was the second transition country to introduce 
inflation targeting. Its approach to inflation targeting differs in some important aspects from 
the Czech Republic.  
 
  As a part of Poland’s big bang approach to macroeconomic stabilization, the zloty 
was pegged to a basket of currencies in 1990. But inflation did not decline sufficiently 
rapidly, and fixed nominal exchange rate resulted in rapid real appreciation and erosion of 
competitiveness. Therefore, a preannounced crawling peg was introduced in October 1991. 
Capital account liberalization led in 1994 and 1995 to large capital inflows, which forced the 
authorities to widen the crawling exchange rate band in May 1996 to ± 7 percent. Upward 
pressure on the currency continued, and in December 1995, the central rate was revalued by 
6.4 percent  in order to be aligned with prevailing market rate. In early 1998, the NBP began 
to widen the band again: to ±10 percent in February 1998, to ±12.5 percent in October 1998, 
and finally to ± 15 percent in March 1999. At the same time, the rate of crawl was reduced 
from an initial 1.8 percent per month in 1991 to 0.3 percent per month. The main reason for 
the gradual widening of the band was the effort of the NBP to be better able to accommodate 
large capital inflows.  
 
Poland’s transition to an inflation targeting regime began during 1998. As in 
Hungary, the introduction of inflation targeting was preceded by the amendment of the Act 
on the National Bank of Poland. This Act specified that the primary objective of the National   
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Bank of Poland (NBP) is to maintain a stable price level and simultaneously support 
economic policy of the Government, provided that this does not constrain the execution of 
the primary target. The Act also established the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) of the NBP, 
which replaced the NBP Management Board as the decision-making body. In April 1998, the 
MPC updated the Assumptions of Monetary Policy for 1998, prepared originally by NBP 
Management Board in September 1997, and confirmed that the 1998 NBP inflation target of 
9.5 percent remained unchanged.
11  In June 1998, the MPC defined target for monetary 
policy in 1999, which was to reduce inflation to 8-8.5 percent and began to work on 
Assumptions of Monetary Policy for 1999, as well as on Medium-Term Monetary Policy 
Strategy for 1999-2003. These documents were approved in September 1998, and at the same 
time, the NBP officially announced the introduction of inflation targeting. The NBP also 
announced at that time the medium-term inflation target for 2003 – reduction of inflation to 
less than 4 percent. The NBP also informed that from now on, annual inflation targets would  
be announced in Assumptions of the Monetary Policy.  
 
It should be noted that at the time of announcement to implement inflation targeting, 
Poland still maintained an exchange rate band which at the time of announcement was 
widened from  ± 10 percent to ±12.5 percent, and later to ±15 percent. Only in April 2000 did 
Poland abandon the exchange rate band and switched to a managed float.   
 
Poland has decided to target the broad consumer price index. The NBP explained that 
CPI has been used extensively in Poland since the beginning of transition, and that it is 
deeply rooted in public perceptions as the measure of inflation. The CPI provides accurate 
information about changes in price levels of consumer goods and services. Application of 
some measure of core inflation would require eliminating from the targeted index some 
prices of goods and services that affect strongly public perception of inflationary 
developments. However, the NBP has started preparatory work for calculating the core 
inflation index and it did not exclude that it would start targeting core inflation in the 
future.
12   
 
Like the Czech Republic, Poland has chosen to target a band rather than a point. 
Initially, it chose a quite narrow target range, just one half of percentage point, which was 
subsequently widened to 1.2 points. The NBP explains that before the introduction of 
inflation targeting, monetary targets in Poland were defined as fixed points, and a wider band 
could possibly signal to public a weaker commitment to reduce inflation. It could be argued 
that under such circumstances, a fixed point could be better than a narrow band, as both are 
                                                 
11 This should be interpreted more as a forecast rather than a full-fledged inflation target. 
12 See  National Bank of Poland (1998). It is noteworthy that the NBP intends to calculate the 
core inflation itself. Usually, central banks targeting a measure of underlying inflation do not 
calculate this index. In order to avoid a conflict of interest, they let other agencies, mainly 
statistical office, to calculate and publish underlying inflation.   
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unlikely to be hit, and the damage of missing a point could be less serious than the damage of 
missing a band. However, the NBP did not exclude that it may widen the band in the future. 
 
  Unlike the Czech National Bank, the NBP did not define explicitly exceptions that 
would allow missing the inflation target without requiring the monetary policy response. 
However, the NBP subsequently analyzed in depth the process of inflation in Poland and the 
role of monetary and nonmonetary factors (National Bank of Poland (2001), appendix 2). 
Specifically, the NBP calculates and analyzes different measures of the core inflation. It 
explains that even though core inflation rates do not replace the headline consumer price 





  The introduction of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic could be characterized 
as a “big bang” approach. There was a clear break with the past fixed exchange rate regime, 
and after a few months of technical preparation, a full-fledged inflation targeting regime was 
put in place. In contrast, Hungary’s introduction of inflation targeting could be characterized 
as “gradualist”, even more so than for Poland.
13 
 
  Like other transition economies, Hungary adopted early in transition an exchange rate 
peg of the forint against the basket of currencies. However, the peg was adjusted downward 
quite often to maintain external competitiveness. The fluctuation band was gradually 
widened from ± 0.5 percent to ± 2.25 percent, to reduce speculative pressures ahead of the 
predictable adjustments of the parity. But this mechanism did not prevent large short-term 
capital inflows in late 1994, and in March 1995, after a devaluation of 8.3 percent, the regime 
of ad hoc adjustment was replaced with a crawling band. The monthly rate of crawl was 
initially set at 1.9 percent monthly, but was gradually reduced down to 0.4 percent monthly 
after October 1999. This regime succeeded in bringing inflation down from about 30 percent 
in 1995 to below 10 percent in 1999.  
 
  Even at the time when the Czech Republic and Poland were abandoning fixed 
exchange rate regimes, the Hungarian authorities continued to view this narrow fluctuation 
band as a useful nominal anchor. The band helped reduce inflation and anchor inflation 
expectations, while at the same time avoiding excessive real appreciation and erosion of 
competitiveness. However, like other emerging market countries with a fixed exchange rate, 
Hungary too was ultimately forced to deal with the problems caused by large capital inflows. 
For some time, Hungary was able to avoid pressure on the narrow exchange rate band 
because of the presence of controls on short-term capital flows. These controls were effective 
                                                 
13 Perhaps this is just another example of the gradualist approach of Hungary to economic 
reforms more generally, unlike the “big bang” or “shock therapy” approach applied in the 
Czech Republic and Poland.   
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in introducing a wedge between onshore and offshore interest rates, providing some degree 
of independence to monetary policy. But it was clear that as capital controls would be relaxed 
in line with progression to EU accession, a narrow band regime would become more difficult 
to sustain.  
 
  The problems with the narrow exchange rate band began to intensify in the course of 
2000. Inflation, which declined significantly in the period 1995-1999, began to creep up 
again. While this increase in inflation was initially triggered by external shocks, like higher 
world oil prices, domestic factors began to play a role as well, including the exchange rate 
regime. The constraints of the narrow band and increasing capital inflows in 2000 began to 
make it more difficult for the central bank to pursue simultaneously disinflation and nominal 
exchange rate stability. Early in 2000, the central bank acted to reduce the pressure on the 
exchange rate band by cutting interest rates, and it also threatened to introduce capital 
controls. This strategy worked, and the exchange rate depreciated. However, in a situation of 
strong economic growth, robust domestic demand and tight labor markets, reducing interest 
rates did not help much in fighting inflation, which remained relatively high. Periodically, 
speculative pressures for appreciation and widening of the band appeared, forced the central 
bank to cut interest rates and/or intervene in foreign exchange market. It opted to do mainly 
the latter, and it sterilized the liquidity created as a result of these interventions.  
 
  However, as the sterilization costs were increasing, it was becoming clear that narrow 
exchange rate band had outlived its usefulness, and that Hungary needed to introduce more 
exchange rate flexibility if it was to succeed in reducing inflation further.
14 In May 2001, the 
authorities finally decided to widen the fluctuation band around the forint parity against the 
euro to ±15 percent.
15 The crawling regime was maintained, with the rate of crawl reduced to 
0.2 percent monthly, and remaining controls on short-term capital flows were phased out.  In 
October 2001, the crawling peg was completely abolished. 
                                                 
14 In 2000, inflation ended at 10.1 percent (December to December), much more than the 
government had projected earlier. In 1999, the government projected that average annual 
inflation would be 6-7 percent in year 2000. In early 2001, inflation increased further, close 
to 11 percent. Hungary’s ambition to join the EU and EMU as soon as possible had probably 
contributed to the increasing emphasis on further progress with disinflation that could be 
accomplished only with a higher degree of nominal exchange rate flexibility, and on the 
willingness to accept the consequences of a stronger currency for the competitiveness and 
external balance. 
15 Israel also adopted an inflation targeting regime with a narrow exchange rate band in 1991.  
Like Hungary, it also found it necessary to widen the exchange rate band, doing so in 1995.  
Over time, the Israeli’s have further downplayed the exchange rate in their inflation targeting 
regime.  For a discussion of Israeli inflation targeting and the role of the exchange rate, see 
Leiderman (2000) and Bernanke et al. (1999).   
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 While a wider exchange rate band should allow the government to attach more 
priority to fighting inflation, as we will discuss below, a conflict between the inflation target 
and exchange rate target could still arise and complicate the conduct of monetary policy. 
However, the change in the monetary policy regime has been somewhat confused. At the 
time when the authorities decided to widen the fluctuation band, they did not immediately 
announce a shift to a new monetary policy regime. Even though the new exchange rate band 
was too wide to serve as a useful nominal anchor, the authorities were moving to inflation 
targeting only gradually. But on July 13, 2001, the new Act on the National Bank of Hungary 
was enacted by Parliament, which defined the achievement and maintenance of price stability 
as the prime objective of the National Bank of Hungary. The Act also sought to reinforce 
NBH independence, in accordance with the EU requirement.  
 
  In its August 2001 Quarterly Inflation report, the NBH explained that for the next 
couple of years it would be using the inflation targeting system to achieve a gradual 
reduction of inflation to level corresponding to price stability (National Bank of Hungary, 
2001, pp. 35-36). The NBH objective is to meet the Maastricht criterion on inflation in 2004-
2005, so that it could join the EMU in 2006-2007. Specifically, the NBH states that it will 
seek to bring inflation down to around 2 percent. In agreement with the Government, the 
NBH set an inflation target of 7 percent for December 2001, 4.5 percent for 2002 and 3.5 
percent for 2003 and 2004. In recognition of the fact that the NBH cannot instantly offset 
unexpected inflationary shocks, it has also established a ±1 percent tolerance band around the 
announced disinflation path.   
  
  The primary instrument that the NBH uses to attain its inflation targets will be 
changes in its benchmark interest rates. The NBH has particularly emphasized the important 
role of changes in exchange rate on inflation. It argues that in Hungary, the exchange rate 
channel is the central bank’s most powerful and fastest means of influencing domestic prices.  
(However, we will see later in Section 5 that this reasoning may be dangerous.)  While the 
exchange rate will not have the same prominent role as during the narrow-band regime, and 
the NBH will be less able to control its short-term movements, it will continue to play an 
important role. The NBH has indicated that it would try to influence the exchange rate in 
order to achieve the desired inflation outcome. In order to achieve the changes in exchange 
rate, it will use mainly changes in interest rates, while direct intervention in foreign exchange 
market will be used only exceptionally, to deal with the emergency situations. The NBH 
recognizes that in the short-term, the actual exchange rate could deviate from an exchange 
rate path that would be consistent with the disinflation path. All in all, exchange rate 
movements seem to play a much more important role in Hungary than in other inflation 
targeting countries. Such explicit emphasis of the role of exchange rate movements in 
achieving inflation targets as seen in Hungary is quite unique. 
 
  The NBH estimates that it takes up to one and half year for changes in interest rates to 
have a full impact on inflation. It argues that if it would try to keep inflation in line with the 
targeted path over the short-term horizon, the result could be excessive volatility of output 
(and arguably also excessive instrument volatility). Therefore, it would confine policy   
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responses only to deviation of forecasted inflation from targeted inflation over the horizon of 
1 to 1.5 years.  
 
  The transparency of this new system should be enhanced by the publication of NBH’s 
inflation projections every quarter for the following six quarters. Moreover, the NBH will 
also publish its considerations that were behind its monetary policy decisions, and its analysis 
of the achievement of inflation target. Quarterly Report on Inflation contains also the 
projection of inflation using a fan chart. 
 
  Unlike the CNB, the NBH began to target headline inflation immediately. But there is 
no discussion in NBH official documents about the reasons for choosing to target headline 
inflation rather than adjusted or underlying inflation. The NBH also did not specify any 
exceptions that would justify a deviation of actual inflation from its inflation target, though 
there is some discussion in its inflation reports about the possible extent of price deregulation 
and their effects on headline inflation. When announcing the introduction of inflation 
targeting, the NBH was also silent about the possible conflict between the exchange rate 
band and the inflation target.  
 
  Overall, the impression is that the NBH has focused less on operational aspects of the 
inflation targeting regime than has the CNB or even the NBP. Perhaps this reflects the fact 
that the NBH officials still attach importance to the nominal exchange rate band as an 
important anchor of the economy. They seem to believe that moving the exchange rate within 
the band will help them to achieve long-term inflation target which will allow them to qualify 
for the EMU. In a sense, this strategy could be understood: why invest heavily in a detailed 
design of policy framework that will anyway be removed in a few years after Hungary adopts 
the euro? The Czech Republic and Poland introduced inflation targeting much earlier, and 
they may also be less eager to join the EMU as soon as possible. This means that inflation 
targeting could be in place for a longer time, and that a well-designed inflation targeting 
framework was more necessary. 
 
 
4. Preliminary experience with inflation targeting 
 
  In view of the relatively short period during which inflation targeting has been 
implemented in the transition economies, it is too early to make a definitive judgment about 
the experience with the operation of this new policy framework. Nevertheless, some 
preliminary observations could be made. There are two ways in which we can evaluate the 
experience with inflation targeting in transition economies.  
 
            First, we can look how successful were inflation targeting central banks in achieving 
inflation rates close to their inflation targets. Here, the answer is “not all that well”. Initially, 
the CNB has several times significantly undershot its inflation target, while the NBP has first 
overshot it and subsequently undershot it. The NBH has hit its targets in 2001 and  2002, but 
its short experience with inflation targeting does not tell us much yet. But even this short-  
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term experience brings one thing clear, namely the problems of targeting simultaneously 
inflation and exchange rate in a world of free capital flows.  
 
  Second, we can examine the success of inflation targeting in reducing inflation. 
Looking only on the success in hitting their inflation targets could be a too narrow 
perspective for assessing the performance of inflation targeting. All central banks in 
inflation-targeting transition economies have emphasized that the main purpose of inflation 
targeting framework is to allow these countries to bring inflation down to a level that would 
allow them to qualify for EMU membership. When we evaluate inflation targeting from this 
perspective, the preliminary experience with this regime should be judged more positively: 
all three countries are proceeding well with disinflation, and there is a good chance that in a 
few years, they should be able to reach price stability, as defined for the purpose of EMU 
qualification. However, the process of disinflation is not a smooth one, and there are quite 
large variations in inflation. 
 
Let us now look in more detail on the record of implementation of inflation targeting 
in the three analyzed countries. First, we will discuss the speed of disinflation implied by 
announced inflation targets, and then we will examine how successful the inflation targeting 
countries were in hitting these targets. 
 
 
4.a. Inflation targets and the speed of disinflation 
 
In many advanced economies that pursue inflation targeting, this regime has been 
introduced only after price stability has been reached (Bernanke et. al. (1999)).  But this was 
not the case in the transition economies where at the time of introduction of inflation 
targeting, inflation was still running well above the level considered consistent with price 
stability. Therefore, the authorities in these countries had to make two decisions: (1) to 
quantify inflation target that would be compatible with the long-term objective of price 
stability; and (2) to decide on the time horizon within which this ultimate objective is to be 
met, that is, to decide on the speed of disinflation.  
 
  There is extensive literature discussing how to quantify price stability. In the literature, 
we can find several arguments why central banks should not quantify price stability as inflation 
at zero or near zero (in the range of 0-1 percent). One reason, relates to downward nominal 
wage rigidity. If the inflation rate were to approach zero under the condition of downward wage 
rigidity, it would be difficult to achieve real wage adjustment in response to changed market 
conditions, such as a negative demand shocks. The result could be higher real wages than is 
desirable, higher unemployment and lower economic growth.
 16  A second reason relates to the 
                                                 
16 This mechanism is described in Akerlof et al. (1996), but it is highly controversial because 
the evidence that low inflation leads to a rise in unemployment is very mixed.  In addition 
while as pointed out in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1999), inflation can not only put 
(continued)   
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impossibility of reducing nominal interest rates below zero, which means that if inflation is 
close to zero, real interest rates cannot be pushed below zero when this might be necessary in 
order to stimulate economic activity.
17  Furthermore, a zero inflation target may lead to periods 
of deflation which could promote financial instability and make it harder to conduct monetary 
policy because interest rates would no longer provide a useful guide to the stance of monetary 
policy (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002)). 
 
  In the literature, one can observe a convergence of views that an inflation rate of 1-3 
percent corresponds to price stability (Table 2). If we look at how central banks quantify 
price stability in practice, we see that there is not much difference between the theoretical 
conclusions and what the central banks actually do. This is the case for all economies -- 
developed, developing and transition ones. 
 
Table 2. Inflation targets 
 
Country  Targeted inflation in %  Period 
Czech Republic  1-3 (2-4 ) 1/  2005 
Australia  2-3  Average during a business cycle 
Brazil 
18 2-6 2001 
Chile 2-4  2001 
Poland <  4  2003 
Hungary  Around 2   2004-2005 
Mexico 3  2003 
Izrael 3-4  2001 
New Zealand  0-3  From 1996 
Canada 1-3  From  1995 
Euro area  < 2  From 1999 
United Kingdom  2.5  From 1996 
 
Source: Andrea Schaecher aj. (2000); web sites of Banco de México, 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/, National Bank of Hungary, http://www.mnb.hu/,  and European 
Central Bank, http://www.ecb.int/. 
1/ 1-3 percent is for net inflation, 2-4 percent for headline inflation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
“grease” in the labor markets as Akerlof. et. al argue, but can also put in “sand” that makes 
the labor markets less efficient.  
17 This argument has been made in Summers (1991). 
18 For 2002, the target was subsequently set at 2.5-4.5 percent, but as a result of the debt 
crisis and sharp currency depreciation, inflation in 2002 has reached 12.5 percent. In 
response to higher inflation, the central bank has also raised its 2003 and 2004 targets.   
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  However, some have raised the quesiton whether the specific conditions of transition 
economies would not justify targeting somewhat higher inflation than in developed 
economies. High growth countries typically experience real exchange rate appreciation by an 
amount proportional to the relative difference of traded to non-traded sector productivity growth 
relative to the rest of the world (the Harrod-Belassa-Samuelson effect).  If it is appropriate for 
these countries to aim at traded goods inflation similar to industrialized countries in the long 
run, then trend real appreciation requires a domestic non-traded goods inflation that is somewhat 
higher and so the inflation rate should be slightly higher than it would be desirable for average-
growth countries.  Škreb (1998) notes that in the transition economies, it is particularly 
difficult to measure precisely the improvements in the quality of goods. As a result, actual 
inflation could be much lower than measured inflation. Because of these measurement 
problems, as well as other reasons, Škreb argues that in transition economies, inflation in the 
range of 4-5 percent would correspond to price stability. 
 
  Other authors argue, however, that during the convergence with the developed 
economies,  transition economies should be expected to experience a rapid growth of labor 
productivity from implementation of economic reforms, which should produce lower 
inflation (Deppler, 1998). Clinton (2000) argues that rapid productivity growth in transition 
economies weakens the traditional arguments in favor of a notably higher than zero inflation 
rate. Given the rapid growth of labor productivity, a decline in nominal wages would rarely 
be needed.
19  Similarly, given the high real return on capital and high trend economic growth, 
it is not very likely that a situation would arise in which a central bank would have to 
stimulate an economy in recession with the help of negative real interest rates. 
 
What can be said about the speed of disinflation? Theoretically, disinflation could be 
too quick, resulting in excessively large (though, arguably temporary) loss of output and 
higher unemployment, or it could be too slow, inflation expectations could become more 
entrenched at high level, and this would make it more costly to reduce inflation later.
20 
Therefore, it could be argued that there exists an optimal speed of disinflation which would 
minimize the sacrifice ratio (the ratio of loss of output to disinflation).
21  However, the 
                                                 
19 One problem with this argument is that the rapid productivity growth applies economy-
wide, but there could still be firms or industries where productivity growth would be small or 
negative, and where decline in nominal wages would be called for if inflation would be close 
to zero. 
20 It could be argued that lower inflation means usually higher output growth, and therefore, 
the sooner lower inflation is reached, the sooner will the economy achieve a higher output 
growth. But there are also counterarguments. For example, due to a loss of marketable skills, 
persons that could be seen as temporary unemployed during the period of rapid disinflation 
could become permanently unemployed, which results in an additional loss of output. 
21 For a discussion of the costs of disinflation see Ball (1994). The author comes to the 
conclusion that fast disinflation reduces the sacrifice ratio.   
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determination of this optimal speed of disinflation is less a matter of exact science, and more 
a matter of judgment.  
 
In the literature, a number of factors have been identified that affect the sacrifice 
ratio, that is, the output effect of disinflation. These include the structure of the economy, the 
degree and the way of indexation of wages and other nominal variables, past history of 
inflation and stabilization, credibility of monetary policy, the degree of openness of the 
economy etc. Furthermore, as has been shown in the case of other countries, change in 
inflation is positively correlated with the level of economic activity (Stock and Watson, 
(1999)). Given the fact that economic reasoning does not provide a hard conclusion about the 
optimal speed of disinflation, and in view of the important consequences of the decision 
about the speed of disinflation for the economy and for different groups of population, 
societies pay particular attention to the mechanism how this decision is reached. By its 
nature, the decision about the speed of disinflation is not a purely technocratic decision that 
could be put solely in the hands of professional economists or central bankers. Because 
different speeds of disinflation will  have different consequences for different groups of 
population, this decision is by its nature a political decision, and thus an argument can be 
made for entrusting it to a political body that has a political legitimacy to make such political 
choices. This has implications for the debate on optimal degree of central bank independence 
that is discussed in Section 5. 
 
However, for transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the desire to join at 
some point in the future EMU is of more practical relevance for monetary policy and the 
theoretical arguments about the appropriate quantification of price stability and the optimal 
speed of disinflation. Eventual EMU accession will depend on the ability to meet the 
Maastricht criteria including low inflation, and the decision to join the EMU at a certain date 
will thus implicitly contain a decision on how quickly and how far disinflation will have to 
go.  
 
  At this stage, all three countries that we examine have expressed a commitment to 
join the EMU, even though they may choose a different speed with which to move from 
joining the EU to joining the EMU. But notwithstanding this possible different speed, all 
three countries are committed to a relatively fast disinflation. Table 3 summarizes the speed 
of disinflation implied by the level of inflation at the time of the introduction of inflation 
targets and by the long-term inflation objective.  
 












Year to be 
Achieved 
CR 10.0  Dec  97 10.0  Rising  2-4  2005 
Hungary  18.4  Aug 01  8.7  Falling  Around 2  2004-5 
Poland  13.2  June 98  12.2  Falling  < 4  2003 
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1/ All inflation figures refer to CPI 
 
  As we can see, the ultimate objective is defined in each country in a different way: as 
a range in the Czech Republic (both upper and lower band is specified); as a maximum 
ceiling in Poland (only upper band is specified), and as a “soft” point target in Hungary (no 
lower and upper bound specified, but inflation should meet the Maastricht criterion). This 
also means that one single inflation rate could meet all these constraints at the same time. 
 
  Even though the Czech Republic did not reveal a firm intention to choose the fastest 
possible strategy to join the EMU, the CNB has still opted for a relatively quick disinflation 
so that it would be able to meet the Maastricht criterion and eventually move quickly to the 
EMU membership if it chooses to.  Figure 1 shows the CNB’s actual and inflation targets.  
When the inflation targeting framework was adopted in December 1997, inflation was 10 
percent, and it continued to rise, to about 13 percent in early 1998 (in CPI terms; net inflation 
approached 8 percent).  The CNB decided that at the end of 1998, net inflation should decline 
to 5.5-6.5 percent; and at the end of year 2000, to 3.5-5.5 percent. In December 1999, the 
CNB quantified its long-term objective of price stability: net inflation in the range 1-3 
percent in 2005, which was subsequently complemented by setting the 2005 CPI target in the 
range 2-4 percent. Given the inflation target for the year 2000 in the range of 3.5-5.5 percent, 
this implied an average annual reduction in net inflation by 0.5 percentage points. The CNB 
explained that this long-term target would basically imply a continuation of the existing pace 
of disinflation. However, in December 2002, CPI inflation fell to 0.6 percent, which already 
brought it well below the long-term target range.  
 
In Poland, the NBP first set a short-term inflation target in June 1998 for end-1999 in 
the range of 8-8.5 percent (see Figure 2). At the time of the announcement of the inflation 
target, inflation was above 12 percent, and declining. In September 1999, the NBP also 
announced the medium-term target of CPI inflation of less than 4 percent at the end of  2003. 
Subsequently, inflation continued to fall faster that expected, and in March 1999, when it fell 
to around 6 percent, the NBP modified the end-1999 CPI target to 6.6-7.8 percent. In 
September 1999, in Monetary Guidelines for the Year 2000, the NBP set end-2000 inflation 
target in the range 5.4-6.8 percent. However, the process of disinflation in Poland was 
interrupted, as inflation increased from 5.6 percent in February 1999 to 11.6 percent in July 
2000. Therefore, the 2001 inflation target was set higher than in 2000, 6-8 percent, but the 
targeted inflation range for the end-2002 was reduced to 4-6 percent. As inflation at the end 
of 2001 fell to 3.6 percent, meeting this target would have required another mild pick-up in 
inflation. But instead, inflation in 2002 fell rapidly and in December 2002 reached 0.8 
percent, resulting in another significant undershooting of the target.  Right now, inflation in 
Poland is below the NBP long-term objective.  
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Hungary launched official inflation targeting only in mid-2001.
22 At that time, 
inflation was already declining: from a peak of 10.8 percent in May 2001, it fell to 8.7 
percent in August when details of the new inflation targeting regime were published in the 
Quarterly Inflation Report (see Figure 3). For 2001, the inflation target was set in the range 
6-8 percent. For 2002, inflation target was set at 3.5-5.5 percent, and for 2003, the target was  
set at 2.5-4.5 percent.
23 The long-term NBH’s objective is that Hungary meets the Maastricht 
criterion on inflation in 2004-2005, which should be possible with inflation even slightly 
higher that 2 percent that the NBH seeks to achieve in long-term. Unlike the Czech Republic 
and Poland, Hungary also specified its long-term inflation target qualitatively, in terms of 
meeting the Maastricht criterion for inflation, thus underscoring its preference to join EMU 
sooner rather than later.  As inflation in December 2002 was 4.8 percent, meeting the long-
term inflation target would likely require stabilizing inflation slightly below present level, in 
contrast to the Czech Republic and Poland, where inflation is likely to pick-up somewhat 
from present unsustainable low levels.  
 
4.b. Hitting and missing inflation targets 
 
In the previous part, we have examined the experience with inflation targeting from 
the perspective of disinflation. In this section, we look at how successful the three countries 
were in meeting their inflation targets. In this respect, we should keep in mind that countries 
could be quite successful, in the longer-term, in bringing inflation down, but if a successful 
disinflation is accompanied by a significant instability of inflation (as evidenced by repeated 
large undershooting or overshooting of inflation targets), this could be costly for the 
economy as well. 
 
There is not yet much we can read from the history of inflation targeting in Hungary 
because it is so recent (see Figure 3).  The 2001 target was announced only in August 2001, 
and it therefore was more a short-term inflation forecast that actual inflation target. 
Therefore, the fact that Hungary has met this target and the 2002 target does not tell much 
about the operation of inflation targeting framework.
24 The inflation target for 2002 implied a 
                                                 
22 The NBH was publishing inflation objectives based on Government budgetary projections 
for 1998, 1999 and 2000 (12-13 percent, 9 percent and 6-7 percent respectively), but these 
were not formal inflation targets and there was no formal requirement for the NBH to meet 
them (see Siklos and Ábel (2001)).  
23 The long-term inflation target and the 2002 target were announced in the August 2001 
Inflation Report, while the 2003 target was announced in the press on December 2001, when 
the government agreed with the NBH’s proposal. 
24 It will be interesting to watch how inflation targeting will operate in 2003, as the potential 
conflict between the inflation target and exchange rate target will come to the fore and as 
markets already expect the 2003 inflation to exceed the 2003 NBH target.   
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fairly rapid disinflation, alongside the trend started in mid-2001. In 2001 and 2002, 
disinflation was helped by the appreciation of the forint.  However, since the forint has 
reached the upper end of the fluctuation band and the government seems to resist the 
revaluation of parity, there is no room for further nominal appreciation that would assist in 
further disinflation.  
 
Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 show the history of inflation targeting in the Czech 
Republic and Poland tell a very different story. In the Czech Republic, the CNB significantly 
undershot its inflation targets, particularly in 1998 and 1999, and less in 2000. Net inflation 
fell to 1.7 percent at the end of 1998 and to 1.5 percent at the end of 1999, well below the 
CNB’s targets. Only in 2001, in the fourth year of inflation targeting, did the CNB succeed in 
achieving its inflation target, but it undershot its target again in 2002.  
 
 
Table 4. Targeted and actual inflation in Czech Republic and Poland 
 
Czech Republic (net inflation)  Poland (headline inflation)   
Target Actual Target  Actual 
1998 5.5-6.5  1.7  X  8.6 
1999 4-5  1.5  6.4-7.8  (8-8.5)1/  9.8 
2000 3.5-5.5  3  5.4-6.8  8.5 
2001 2-4  2.4  6-8  3.6 
2002 2.75-4.75  2/  0.5  4-6  0.8 
  
Source: Czech National Bank, National bank of Poland 
1/ Initial target in brackets  
2/ Headline inflation  
 
As we can see in Figure 2, in Poland there was an opposite problem, as the NBP 
significantly overshot its targets in 1999 and 2000. In the course of 1998, inflation in Poland 
was falling rapidly, and at the end of the year, it fell to 8.6 percent, less than the 9.5 percent 
projected. A more rapid than expected decline in inflation prompted the NBP to reduce early 
in 1999 its target for end-1999, from 8-8.5 percent to 6.4-7.8 percent, a step which in 
retrospect may seem to have been somewhat premature. If the NBP maintained its original 
target 8-8.5 percent, it would have missed it only by a very small margin. But in the course of 
1999, inflation began to increase again, and the 1999 target was missed by a significant 
margin, as was the 2000 target. Very tight monetary policy and slowing economic activity 
helped to bring inflation down sharply in 2001, and subsequently, the 2001 and 2002 targets 
were undershot quite sizably.  
 
These repeated large deviations of actual inflation from inflation target would seem to 
suggest that inflation targeting was not very successful in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
But before we make any definitive judgments about the success or failure of inflation 
targeting in these two countries, it is important to understand the reasons for such significant   
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deviations of actual from targeted inflation. We have to examine more closely both domestic 
and external economic circumstances that have prevailed during this period, and that have 
affected actual inflation.  
 
At the time when the CNB launched inflation targeting, inflation was rising quite rapidly, but 
at the same time, the economy was already slipping into a prolonged recession. The 1998 and 
2000 inflation targets were specified at the time when the CNB (and other public and private 
forecasters) expected much stronger economic growth than actually materialized.
25 However, 
with the onset of a major banking crisis in 1997-98, economic activity fell and contributed to 
a much faster disinflation than envisaged by CNB’s inflation targets.
26 Moreover, the 1997-
1998 financial crises and weak global economic activity contributed to falling commodity 
prices, including energy prices.
27 The CNB calculations suggest that these external factors 
had a sizeable effect on net inflation: in 1998, these factors reduced net inflation by 2-3 
percentage points („apek (1999), p. 9). In the absence of these shocks, net inflation at the end 
of 1998 would probably have been close to the bottom of the target range. There were also 
other structural shocks that contributed to lower than projected inflation. Among the more 
important was the continuing unexpected decline in foodstuff prices in 1998 and 1999. Ex 
post, the decline in foodstuff prices was ascribed to the struggle of the retail distributors for 
market share in the Czech market. Weak domestic demand, together with strong koruna and 
strong competitive pressure in the domestic economy resulting from penetration on the Czech 
market of foreign distributors continued to keep inflation low even after the effects of 
external price shocks began to disappear   In addition, the decision not to exclude energy 
prices and exclude adjustment of regulated prices from the targeted price index did not 
achieve its objective of encouraging the government to pursue a “courageous policy of price 
deregulation”, as the CNB initially hoped.  
 
 
When inflation targeting was introduced, Poland was facing very different economic 
circumstances than the Czech Republic. First, the implications of global developments for 
                                                 
25 For example, the May 1998 World Economic Outlook projected real GDP growth in 1998 
of  2.2 percent. This forecast was quite accurate, but with an opposite sign. Actual growth 
was –2.2 percent.  
26 Of course, the hotly debated question was whether and to what extent the CNB’s 
excessively tight monetary itself contributed to slower than projected growth. 
27 In U.S. dollar terms, oil price fell by 31.2 percent, while nonfuel commodity prices fell by 
14.7 percent in 1998. See International Monetary Fund (1999). It should be noted that this 
effect of financial crises contributed to an unexpected fall in inflation worldwide. The May 
1997 IMF World Economic Outlook projected that in 1998, consumer prices in advanced 
economies would increase by 2.5 percent, while the actual increase was only 1.5 percent.    
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domestic inflation were better known to the NBP at that time, and could be incorporated into 
the inflation target. Like in the Czech Republic, inflation in Poland has declined significantly 
during 1998 and 1999, but this decline was less dramatic, and did not last as long. Already in 
the second half of 1999, inflation in Poland began to exceed by increasingly wider margin 
inflation in the Czech Republic (see chart 1). Relatively rapid economic growth of domestic 
demand, increase in import prices and monopolistic structure of some industries together 
resulted in the reversal of disinflation in Poland in the course of 1999. Fiscal policy was also 
much more expansionary than the NBP has expected, and this expansionary stance further 
fueled domestic demand.  
 
The NBP responded to these developments by a significant tightening of monetary 
policy, and it continued to keep monetary conditions very tight even when inflation began to 
fall sharply later in 2000 and in 2001. This – to some excessively – tight monetary policy 
also brought economic growth nearly to a halt by the end of 2001, and contributed to 
increased tension between the NBP and the government, which even led by the end of 2001 
to threats of reduction of NBP independence. It appears that the NBP tried to use a tight 
monetary policy stance as an instrument to force the government to strengthen structural 
fiscal balance, even at the cost of significant undershooting of its inflation target.  
 
Judging from the success in meeting its inflation target, the NBP has not been very 
successful thus far. In the first two years, inflation targets were overshot, and in the third and 
fourth years, there was a significant undershooting. Recent years saw a significant instability 
of inflation, which was falling rapidly from 17.8 percent in the beginning of 1997 to 5.6 
percent in February 1999, then rose to 11.6 percent in July 2000, and fell again to 0.8 percent 
in December 2002. In Poland, external factors may have been of less importance in 
explaining the failure to meet inflation targets than in the Czech Republic, while the conduct 
of macroeconomic policy has probably mattered more. First, unexpected fiscal expansion, 
combined with easy monetary policy, contributed to the acceleration of inflation and 
overshooting of inflation targets; and subsequently, sharp tightening of monetary policy, in 
the absence of further easing of fiscal policy, reduced inflation sharply down and produced a 
significant undershooting of the target. 
 
4.c.  Comparison of Inflation and Output Performance of inflation targeters with other 
transition countries 
 
   
  We have seen above that hitting inflation targets has not been an easy exercise.  
However, this may have been unavoidable given the shocks the inflation targeters were 
subjected to.    To access the success of inflation targeting in transition countries, we have to 
ask how well the inflation targeters have done relative to the non-targeters? 
 
  There are two alternative monetary policy regimes to inflation targeting that transition 
countries have chosen:   
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1.  exchange rate peg:  a crawling peg for Hungary until August 2001, a 
standard peg for Latvia (peg to SDR) and a hard peg of the currency board 
type for Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia. 
2.  float without an inflation target: Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania.
28  
 
Figures 4 and 5 compare inflation rates (year over year) in the Czech Republic and 
Poland with the other transition countries.  A relevant starting date for comparing the 
different monetary regimes is December 1998 (marked in the figures)  which corresponds to 
the first date that inflation targets were to be met in the Czech Republic.  As we can see in 
Figure 4 which has a comparison with the non-inflation targeting floaters, the Czech 
Republic and Poland have experienced lower levels of inflation for most of the 1999-2002 
period than have the non-inflation targeting floaters.  On the other hand, Figure 5, which has 
a comparison with the exchange rate peggers, does not display a clear dominance of inflation 
targeting over pegging.  Hungary with its soft peg and Bulgaria with its currency board have 
typically had higher inflation rates than the Czech Republic and Poland, but Lithuania with 
currency board and Latvia with its standard peg have experienced lower inflation rates.  
Estonia has had inflation rates comparable to those in the Czech Republic, but up until the 
last half of 2002, has had lower inflation than Poland. 
 
Clearly a low level of inflation is only one measure of success of monetary regimes – 
equally important is the variability of inflation and output.  Table 5 provides the standard 
deviation of both inflation and output for the period 1999-2002.  Here we see that the Czech 
Republic and Poland are in the middle of the pack on both criteria.  The Czech Republic and 
Poland have higher standard deviations of inflation than the hard pegging, Baltic countries, 
while they have lower variability than Hungary, a soft pegger, Bulgaria, a hard pegger, and 
Slovakia and Romania, non-inflation targeting floaters.  Slovenia, a non-inflation targeting 
floater, has equal inflation variability to the Czech Republic, but has lower variability than 
Poland.   
 
Although, we should not make too much of the data in Figures 4 and 5 and Table 5 
because it is over such a short period and because these countries have been subjected to 
different shocks, it is worth noting in terms of inflation control, inflation targeting does not 
clearly dominate the other monetary policy regimes chosen by transition countries. 
 
  We reach a similar conclusion in terms of output variability as seen by the standard 
deviations of output growth reported in Table 5.
29  The Czech Republic and Poland have had 
                                                 
28 Currency regimes of these countries are characterized as managed floats. In June 2001, 
Romania’s currency regime was reclassified from a managed float to a crawling band 
because the central bank intervenes to prevent currency appreciation.   
29 The mixed results reported here on the performance of inflation targeting regimes relative 
to other monetary policy regimes is not very surprising.  As argued by Calvo and Mishkin 
(2003), the choice of monetary policy regime is likely to be less important to the 
(continued)   
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lower standard deviations than the hard peggers, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, but have had 
higher standard deviations than Slovakia and Slovenia, non-inflation targeting floaters.  
Hungary, a soft pegger for most of the period has had the lowest standard deviation of output 
growth of all the countries in the table.  However, even less should be made of these 
comparisons because real shocks have differed dramatically across the transition countries.  
For example, as we can see in Figure 6, the Baltic countries, which have a higher proportion 
of their trade with Russia as a result of their having been part of the former Soviet Union, 
suffered very dramatic output declines in 1999 in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis 
in the fall of 1998.  The contraction of the Russian economy at that time would have had a far 
smaller impact on transition countries which were less integrated with Russia and whose 
trade was mostly with Western Europe.  
 
 
Table 5. Inflation and Output Growth Volatility: 1998-2002 
 
  Inflation volatility  Output volatility 
Czech Republic  3.49  2.00 
Poland 3.6  1.82 
Hungary 3.08  0.72 
Estonia 3.08  3.07 
Latvia 1.34  2.52 
Lithuania 2.18  3.5 
Bulgaria 49.7  3.97 
Slovakia 3.88  1.39 
Slovenia 1.34  0.82 




5.  Lessons and problems of inflation targeting in transition economies 
 
  Even though the experience with the implementation of inflation targeting in 
transition economies is relatively short, it has nevertheless brought out several specific 
issues, which deserve discussion. First, how should the standard operational aspects of 
inflation targeting be specified:   i.e., what price index should be targeted?  should the 
inflation target be a point or a range? and what  should the horizon for the target be?  Second, 
given the fact that transition economies began inflation targeting in a situation of higher 
inflation than the long-term objective, how should the speed of disinflation be determined, 
and closely related, how should the government be involved in setting inflation targets? 
                                                                                                                                                       
macroeconomic performance of emerging market and transition countries than deeper 
institutions.   
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Third, how should monetary policy respond to the deviation of the actual inflation from the 
targeted disinflation path and how much should the floor of an inflation target be emphasized 
relative to the ceiling?  And fourth, how should the exchange rate be incorporated into the 
inflation targeting framework? 
 
5.a. Operational aspects of inflation targeting 
 
  What measure of inflation to target? In deciding what measure of inflation to 
target, central banks face a trade-off between transparency and the ability to control inflation. 
The advantage of a broadly defined headline inflation (i.e. the consumer price index) is that it 
is better understood by the public.  However, the problem is that headline movements could 
reflect factors other than monetary policy measures. A more narrowly defined measure of 
inflation that excludes possible effects of transitory shocks could be better controlled by a 
central bank, but at the same time, it could be more difficult for the public to assess the 
conduct of monetary policy on basis of such measure. Given the emphasis on central banks’ 
accountability and transparency in a regime of inflation targeting, this could potentially be a 
serious handicap, particularly for a central bank that still has to earn its credibility.  
 
  The CNB opted for a compromise that it considered most appropriate for an economy 
in transition. For the purpose of inflation targeting, it introduced a new concept, so-called net 
inflation which excluded regulated prices (see section 3a). Specific conditions of economic 
transition have played an important role in selecting net inflation as the targeted measure of 
inflation. Unlike in industrial countries, many prices were still regulated in the Czech 
Republic in late 1997. The CNB knew that substantial changes in these regulated prices, 
including rents, would be needed before they reached a market-clearing level. As a result, a 
given monetary policy stance could produce different future paths of headline inflation, 
depending on the pace of price deregulation or the size of adjustment of administered prices. 
At the same time, this approach was supposed to avoid a situation where government would 
be hesitant to pursue a faster adjustment of regulated prices out of concern that inflationary 
effects of such policy would force the CNB to tighten monetary policy, with adverse effects 
on economic growth, exacerbating thus the political cost of deregulation. Indeed, the former 
Acting Governor of the CNB Pavel Kysilka stated that “by targeting net inflation, we have 
provided a room to the government to pursue a courageous policy of price deregulation.” 
(Kysilka (1998), pp. 10-12).  Obviously, a high share of regulated prices in total CPI does not 
make it easier for the central bank to deal with this trade-off between transparency and ability 
to control inflation.
30  
                                                 
30 The Czech economy is very open, with imports representing about 50 percent of GDP, and 
changes in import prices of oil and gas have large impact on domestic prices. However, at the 
time of the introduction of inflation targeting, the CNB had considered isolating the effects of 
price deregulation as more important than isolating the effects of terms-of-trade shocks or 
exchange rate effects.    
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  Subsequently, the pace of price deregulation and increase in administered prices was 
less than the CNB had hoped and so use of the net inflation construct did not produce the 
desirable outcome the CNB expected.  In addition, the net inflation construct turned out to be 
more volatile than headline inflation, helping to contribute to larger misses of the target.   
When it decided to target net inflation, the CNB did not exclude that in the future, it could 
modify the measure of targeted inflation.  The problems with the net inflation measure thus 
led the CNB to abandon it in April 2001, and it subsequently moved to targeting headline 
inflation as has been discussed in section 3a.  
 
  Target a point or a range? As in other aspects of design of the operational 
framework, there is a trade-off involved in deciding about the width of the band. A wider 
band increases the chance that monetary policy will be successful in keeping targeted 
inflation inside. But a too large band could reduce the ability of inflation targeting to anchor 
inflation expectations, and it could be of less help in establishing the antiinflationary 
credibility. Some argue that a band that is narrow enough to anchor inflationary expectations 
is likely to be frequently missed, and that it is preferable to target a point and explain the 
deviations of actual inflation from that point target (Bernanke et al (1999) and  Mishkin 
(2001)). 
 
  In a sense, one can argue that higher degree of uncertainty in projecting inflation and 
correspondingly higher probability that even a target range would be missed makes the issue 
of point versus range less of an issue than in more advanced inflation-targeting economies. 
By setting a range, the central bank may indicate what is its estimate of uncertainty of 
reaching the inflation target. This is how the CNB has explained its decision regarding the 
width of the targeted range. Missing a target range then carries a larger risk of credibility loss 
than missing a target point. Targeting a reasonably narrow band (that is, narrow enough so 
that it provides a sufficient nominal anchor) does not make much sense when the probability 
that it would be missed is not significantly less than the probability of missing a point. 
 
  Time horizon of inflation targeting.  Monetary policy affects the economy and 
particularly inflation with long lags.  In industrialized countries, lags from monetary policy to 
inflation are typically estimated to be on the order of two years.  Shorter time horizons, such as 
one year can be highly problematic.  The first problem with too short a horizon is that it can lead 
to a controllability problem:  too frequent misses of the inflation target, even when monetary 
policy is being conducted optimally.  The second problem is that it can lead to instrument 
instability, in which policy instruments are moved around too much in order to try to get 
inflation to hit its targets over the shorter horizon.  A third problem is that too short a horizon 
implies that not enough weight is put on output fluctuations in the central bank's loss function.
31   
 
                                                 
 31As demonstrated by Svensson (1997), a faster target path of inflation to the long-run inflation 
goal implies a smaller weight on output variability in the central bank's loss function.    
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  The experience with inflation targeting in New Zealand documented in Bernanke et al 
(1999), illustrates these problems.  In 1995, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand overshot its one-
year-horizon inflation target range, making the governor subject to dismissal under the central 
banking law.  It was recognized in the Reserve Bank that the overshoot was likely to be short-
lived and inflation was likely to fall, indicating that monetary policy had not been overly 
expansionary.  Fortunately, this view was accepted outside the Bank and the governor, Don 
Brash, whose performance was excellent, retained his job.  Attempting to hit the annual target 
did, however, have the unfortunate consequence of producing excessive swings in the monetary 
policy instruments, especially the exchange rate.  In a small, open economy, like New Zealand, 
exchange rate movements have a faster impact on inflation than interest rates. Thus trying to 
achieve annual inflation targets required heavier reliance on manipulating exchange rates which 
led to its having large swings.  By trying to hit the short-horizon target, the Reserve Bank also 
may have induced greater output fluctuations.  For example, the Reserve Bank pursued overly 
tight monetary policy at the end of 1996 with the overnight cash rate going to 10% because of 
fears that inflation would rise above the target range in 1997, and this helped lead to an 
undesirable decline in output.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has recognized the problems 
it had with a too short target horizon and now emphasizes a horizon of six to eight quarters in 
their discussions of monetary policy (Sherwin (1999) and Drew and Orr (1999)).  Furthermore, 
the Policy Target Agreement between the central bank and the government has recently been 
amended to be more flexible in order to support the longer policy horizon (Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand (2000)). 
 
  The solution to avoiding too short a horizon for the inflation target is to set inflation 
targets for periods two years (or longer) ahead. This automatically implies that the central bank 
will have multi-year inflation targets.  The target for the current calendar year will have been set 
two years previously, while there will also be a target for the following year.  With multi-year 
targets, the target from one year to the next could vary over time.  The inflation target would 
vary in response to shocks to the economy, especially to supply shocks which might need to be 
accommodated in order to keep output fluctuations from getting excessive. Also putting a 
weight on output fluctuations in a central bank's objectives, as is sensible, requires that the 
approach of the inflation target to the long-run goal needs to be gradual (Svennson, 1997).  This 
also suggests the need for multi-year targets in which the inflation target, even one for two years 
ahead, may differ from the long-run target if shocks to the economy have driven inflation away 
from the long-run goal.   
 
  Initially, inflation targets in the transition countries studied here were short, being on 
the order of a year, and the short horizons may have contributed to controllability problem 
and the frequent target misses.  Possibly in response to these problems, the CNB was the first 
to specify a long-term inflation target for a horizon of five years, and  the NBH and the NBP 
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5.b. Who should set the inflation target and decide the speed of disinflation? 
 
  In the 1990s, there has been a significant shift worldwide toward more independent 
central banks, partly in response to a better understanding of economic costs of political 
interference with monetary policy and high inflation. While not all central banks have been 
given complete freedom to set monetary policy targets, most of them gained instrument 
independence, that is, the freedom to conduct monetary policy without external interference 
to meet the objective. Among economists, there seems now to be consensus that central 
banks should have instrument independence, that is, independence to conduct monetary 
policy so as to meet the inflation target or other monetary policy objective. There seems to be 
a consensus that central banks should not have goal independence, that is, independence to 
set inflation targets or other monetary policy objectives (Fischer (1994)).  
 
From the early stages of economic transition, central banks in all three countries have 
received a significant degree of de jure independence, not only in the conduct of monetary 
policy (instrument independence) but also in setting the objectives of monetary policy (goal 
independence).  
 
In the Czech Republic, the independence of the central bank was anchored in the 
Constitution, which stated that the government may only intervene in the CNB’s affairs for 
reasons clearly outlined in the Act on CNB. The Act on CNB (No. 6/1993 of Collection of 
Laws) specified that the primary objective of the CNB is to ensure the stability of the Czech 
national currency (Article 2); that the CNB Board should set monetary policy and the 
instruments for the implementation of these policies (Article 5). Moreover, the Act explicitly 
states that in providing for its primary objective, the CNB shall be independent of any 
instructions given by the Government. The Governor, Vice-Governors and members of the 
Board are appointed and recalled by the President (Article 6). The Act was subsequently 
amended in 2002, and the main objective of the CNB was changed to maintain price stability, 
with the standard qualification that without prejudice to its primary objective, the CNB shall 
support economic policies of the Government leading to sustainable economic growth. The 
amended Act also states that “when providing for the primary objective of the CNB and 
when carrying out their activities, neither the CNB nor the CNB Board shall seek or take 
instructions from the President of the republics, from Parliament, from the Government, from 
administrative authorities or from any other body (Article 9). The appointment of the 
Governor and other CNB officials remains fully the responsibility of the President.  
 
  In Hungary, the Act on National Bank of Hungary was passed in October 1991 and 
reinstated the independence of the NBH. It was amended several times since. The latest 
version from June 2001 (Act LVIII of 2001) states that the primary objective of the NBH 
shall be to achieve and maintain price stability (Article 3) and that the NBH shall define and 
implement monetary policy in the interest of maintaining the stability of the national 
currency (Article 4). Article 6 states that “within the framework provided for by this Act, the 
NBH shall independently define its monetary policy and the instruments for implementing 
such policy.” Article 38 stipulates that the Government may not instruct the NBH in relation 
to its scope of tasks as set forth in the Act. The President of the NBH is appointed for a   
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period of six years by the President of the Republic at the proposal of the Prime Minister. 
The President of the Republics also appoint 3-5 Vice-Presidents and members of the 
Monetary Council. 
 
  The legal position of the National Bank of Poland is similar. The Act on the NBP of 
August 29, 1997 stipulates that the basic objective of the NBP shall be to maintain price 
stability, again with the addition that the NBP shall at the same time support the Government 
economic policies, insofar as this does not constrain pursuit of the basic objective (Article 3). 
The President of the NBP shall be appointed by the Sejm, at the request of the President of 
the Republic, for a period of six years. The Vice-Presidents and other members of the NBP 
Management Board are appointed by the President of the Republic at the request of the 
President of the NBP. The nine members of the Monetary Policy Council are appointed in 
equal numbers by the President of the Republics, the Sejm and the Senate (Article 13). The 
responsibility of the MPC is to draw annual monetary policy guidelines and submit them to 
the Sejm for information (Article 12). Article 21 stipulates that in discharging its 
responsibilities, the NBP shall collaborate with the appropriate bodies of the central 
government in developing and implementing national economic policy and strive to ensure a 
proper performance of monetary policy guidelines. It should submit monetary policy 
guidelines to bodies of central government and report on performance of monetary policy.  
 
  However, de jure independence does not always imply a de facto independence. 
While the NBP is not explicitly forbidden by the Act on NBP to seek instructions from the 
Government and other bodies in pursuing its responsibilities, de facto, it decides alone on 
inflation targets. On the other hand, the NBH is de jure independent and forbidden to seek 
instructions, but in practice, the Governor of the NBH seeks Government endorsement for 
the NBH’s monetary policy objectives. 
 
The effort to make central banks legally independent reflected the belief of reformist 
governments and parliaments that politics should not interfere with the conduct of monetary 
policy. To a large extent, central bank legislature in these countries was modeled after the 
German Bundesbank which itself - for historical reasons - enjoyed a high degree of 
independence. In the early years of transition, no one really questioned the high degree of 
central bank independence in the transition countries, as governments had to deal with the 
more urgent tasks of liberalization, privatization etc. However, the high degree of central 
bank independence eventually became a source of tension.  
 
  These tensions appeared first in the Czech Republic. As we have discussed, in the 
early years of inflation targeting, the CNB has repeatedly undershot its inflation target, while 
economic growth turned negative. In many countries, this would probably be sufficient to 
create tensions between central bank and government. In the Czech Republic, these tensions 
were further aggravated by political developments. To a large extent as a result of poor state 
of the economy in the aftermath of the currency turbulence of 1997, the main pro-reform 
party split and new elections were called for mid-1998. In the meantime, a caretaker 
government was formed and the CNB governor became a caretaker prime minister. When a 
new government was formed after the election, he returned back to the CNB. Inevitably, this   
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has drawn the CNB further into politics, exactly the opposite to what the high degree of de 
jure independence was supposed to achieve.  
 
The party that lost election in 1998 criticized the CNB and the governor for 
mishandling monetary policy, contributing to economic decline and thus affecting the 
outcome of elections. The CNB was considered to be too independent and unwilling to 
coordinate monetary policy with economic policy of the government. The speed of 
disinflation was considered as excessive, hurting economic growth. This criticism eventually 
resulted in legislative effort to curb the CNB's independence. When the CNB and the new 
government introduced jointly to Parliament an amendment to CNB Act to bring it in line 
with the EU standards, members of the party that lost the 1998 election submitted their own 
amendment that aimed at reducing significantly the CNB's independence. They proposed that 
Parliament would supervise and approve the operational budget, salaries of Board members 
were to be cut, monetary policy decision were to be consulted with the government, and 
political partied were to have more say in appointing the governor and Board members.   
 
This proposal was strongly criticized by domestic and foreign financial analysts, by 
the International Monetary Fund and - most importantly - by the European Union and 
European Central Bank. Central bank independence is a requirement for both EU and EMU 
membership, and this argument carried ultimately the largest weight because of the likely 
accession of the Czech Republic into EU/EMU.  In the end, the CNB retained its 
independence, and with the appointment of new governor in 2000, the relationship with the 
Government improved as well.  
 
Similar tensions between central bank and government emerged in Poland during 
2000 and 2001. As economic growth began to falter while interest rates remained high, the 
NBP was blamed by some politicians for having its monetary policy excessively tight, and 
that it contributed to subpar growth performance. Tensions between the government and the 
NBP accelerated in October 2001, after the new government took office. Contributing to the 
tensions was the fact that the president of the NBP Leszek Balcerowicz was himself a former 
politician and main author of the cold-turkey stabilization program that was criticized by the 
center-left politicians that formed the government after the October 2001 elections.  
 
The prime minister and other members of the cabinet have attacked repeatedly the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) for keeping interest rates too high. The pressure to 
reduce the NBP's independence rose and some members of parliament from the two 
governing parties drew legal proposals to broaden the NBP's objectives to include economic 
growth and employment, and to increase the number of members of MPC. Even though the 
government did not formally back these proposals, being well aware that this would 
complicate the EU/EMU accession, it did not mind using them as a tool to put pressure on 
the NBP to ease monetary policy. Because accession to EU/EMU is an important objective 
for Poland, it is not likely that these initiatives will succeed. 
 
The Polish experience also illustrates the peril of central bank effort to use monetary 
policy as a tool to force the government to pursue a more disciplined fiscal policy. The NBP   
  34
tried to use tight monetary policy to press the government to improve structural fiscal 
balance, and kept interest rates very high even as inflation was falling below its target and 
growth came nearly to a halt. But instead of achieving this objective, the NBP has 
antagonized the government and put its independence under risk. 
 
Even Hungary was not spared tensions between the central bank and the government. 
Recently, the Government put forward a bill that proposes to set up a Supervisory Committee 
within the National Bank of Hungary. This Committee would comprise delegates of political 
parties and two persons appointed by the Minister of Finance. Such a committee already 
existed in the past but was abolished. The NBH argues that such a step would infringe on 
NBH's operational independence and would go against the EU requirements on central bank 
independence. Members of the government have also pressured the NBH to reduce interest 
rates in order to support growth. They argue that the NBH should not focus to much on 
inflation.  
 
In Hungary, the reasons for this pressure on the central bank are mainly  political and 
personal. The new NBH president who was appointed in 2001 was a former minister of 
finance and from this position, he was exercising pressure on his predecessor.  However, the 
previous NBH president is in a close contact with the present prime minister and has used 
this to create pressure on his successor. More recently, the conflict between the inflation 
target and exchange rate target has further increased these tensions. 
 
Why do we see these tensions in all three inflation-targeting countries? There are 
several reasons. First, at the beginning of transition, central banks were given a large degree 
of both operational and goal independence. In a situation where inflation is still higher than 
the long-term objective of price stability, this means that central banks are given the freedom 
to decide on the speed of disinflation. As central bankers tend to be more ambitious with 
respect to the speed of disinflation than politicians, this creates potential for tensions. These 
tensions tend to come open once economic growth falters, particularly of this poor growth 
performance is perceived as contributing to a loss of popularity of the governing party(ies). 
In our view, this experience suggests the superiority of closer involvement of political 
authorities in setting monetary policy objectives. Particularly in difficult period of economic 
transition, goal independence of central banks may complicate rather than facilitate the 
conduct of monetary policy.  
 
Second, the fact that politicians became central bank governors, or that central bank 
governors stepped into politics, had the unwanted consequence of drawing central banks 
more into the political arena. Finally, despite significant progress in economic and political 
reforms, the rule of law still remains less firmly established even in the most advanced 
transition economies, making politically motivated attacks on central banks more likely. 
 
  The kind of public disputes between the central bank and the government that we 
have seen in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary is not desirable. It undermines the 
credibility of the inflation targeting framework and could increase the costs of future 
disinflation. As we have already noted, the decision about the speed of disinflation has   
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different impact on different groups in the society, and there is thus a strong case for such 
decision to be made by a politically responsible body like the government. Clearly, it would 
serve better the credibility of monetary policy if the speed of disinflation were the result of a  
joint decision by a central bank and government, though this is not obviously a practice in all 
inflation-targeting countries.
32  Such a joint decision would have several advantages. Most 
important, it would be more credible. When a government decides (perhaps jointly with a 
central bank) on the speed of disinflation, it is explicitly or implicitly committing itself to 
policies supporting this disinflation objective. The speed of disinflation (co)decided by 
government would be seen by markets as a political decision which takes into account 
possible short-term tradeoffs, and it would reduce the probability that policies supporting the 
achievement of targeted disinflation would be challenged on grounds that they do not reflect 
the preferences of the society and that they are unduly costly. 
 
  Even in situations where the ultimate responsibility for deciding the speed of 
disinflation would rest with the government, the central bank could still provide an important 
input into this decision, by voicing (possibly publicly) its own views about the desirable 
speed of disinflation. Of course, there is a risk that government would choose too slow a 
disinflation. However, it is not clear whether this would impose higher costs on the economy 
than a unilateral decision by a central bank to pursue a more rapid disinflation that would be 
subsequently challenged by government as being too ambitious. Furthermore, a unilateral 
decision by the central bank to pursue rapid disinflation is likely to weaken support for the 
central bank as has occurred in the Czech Republic and Poland.  This increases the risk of 
loss of independence and interference with the ability of the central bank to control inflation 
in a longer run context. 
 
  The question who should set inflation targets has a specific aspect in transition 
economies that are expected soon to become members of the EMU. One can argue that when 
the political decision to join the EMU is made, it effectively specified both the disinflation 
path and the ultimate inflation target. The inflation target is determined by the need to meet 
the Maastricht criterion concerning maximum permissible inflation, and the speed with 
which this inflation is to be achieved is determined by the timing of the EMU entry. To the 
extent that there is a firm political commitment to join the EMU, it becomes to a large extent 
irrelevant whether the inflation target is set by a central bank or a government. The 
government does not have much room to be more lenient on inflation than the central bank, 




                                                 
32 Such arrangement need not necessary imply a formal subordination of the central bank to 
government in setting inflation targets. For example, in Australia, the inflation target is set by 
a central bank alone, and the government subsequently endorses publicly this target.    
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5.c. How to respond to deviations of inflation from the target and how much should the 
floor of an inflation target be emphasized relative to the ceiling? 
 
  The implementation of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic and Poland has 
brought out an interesting problem that arises in other inflation-targeting economies as well. 
How to respond to a significant deviation of inflation from the inflation target? If the 
inflation rate overshoots the ceiling of the target range, then the logic of inflation targeting 
clearly requires the central bank to bring the inflation rate back into the target range.  
However, should an inflation-targeting central bank try to lock in a lower than targeted 
inflation once actual inflation falls below the targeted path if inflation is not yet at the long-
run goal?  Another way of asking this question is whether a central bank should emphasize 
the floor of the inflation target as much as the ceiling and thus work as hard to avoid 
undershoots of the target as overshoots. 
 
As we have noted, the CNB significantly undershot its inflation target in 1998 and 
1999, and less so in 2000. Similarly, at the end of 2001, inflation in Poland fell well below 
the NBP end-2001 target. What should central banks do in such situations? Should they be 
upset at the undershoot and indicate that this was a serious mistake.  Alternatively, would it 
be appropriate for them to lock in the unexpectedly rapid disinflation of previous two years, 
and focus its monetary policy on  maintaining from then on price stability?  
 
  A case could be made for acting opportunistically and using faster than expected 
disinflation to lock in this windfall benefit of lower inflation (Haldane (1998)). This is what 
Poland has tried to do, by adjusting its original end-1999 inflation target after actual inflation 
early in 1999 began to fall faster than projected. It would seem that when inflation has been 
reduced to less than the central bank target, but remains still above the level of inflation 
corresponding to price stability, it would make no sense to let inflation go up again, only to 
be forced to reduce it again later. Disinflation, even at a moderate pace, could be costly, and 
if a country can avoid the need to disinflate in the future, this should spare the economy some 
loss of output. Whether past faster than planned  disinflation was a result of luck or 
mistakenly tight monetary policy may seem not to matter, bygones are bygones, past costs, if 
any, have been incurred, and let’s just avoid any future costs of disinflation. 
33 
 
In practice, central banks have treated the floors of inflation target range in different 
ways (Clifton (1999)).  Some treat them as seriously as upper sides of a band, and eased 
monetary policy to bring inflation back up inside the band (e.g., New Zealand in 1991), while 
others preferred to consolidate the unexpected rapid disinflation (Israel in 1998,) 
  
  The recent experience of Poland has shown the risks of trying to lock into lower than 
originally targeted inflation. There are several problems with opportunistic disinflation and 
                                                 
33 Of course, such an argument could be made only if inflation does not fall below the long-
term inflation target corresponding to price stability.   
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for treating the bottom of the band leniently. First, there is a possibility that opportunistic 
disinflation will not find much sympathy with politicians. Particularly if the faster than 
originally intended disinflation coincides with a significant weakening of economic activity, 
there will be calls for a relaxation of monetary policy, even if this should mean a return to 
somewhat higher inflation.  The NBP has exacerbated this problem because its inflation 
target is now stated to be “less than 4%,” suggesting that they are not particularly disturbed 
by undershooting the inflation target.  This may have contributed substantially to the poor 
relations between the NBP and the government and a decrease in public support for the NBP. 
The CNB was well aware of the danger from its undershoots of the inflation target,  and did 
not even suggest that it could lock in the lower than targeted inflation.  
 
Second, if rapid disinflation is a result of temporary external shocks like large 
declines in the price of commodities, it would be a mistake to assume that monetary policy 
could lock in such disinflation forever without large future costs. Once these shocks are over, 
prices of commodities usually do not stay low, but rise again, as global demand recovers. 
Monetary policy that would try to prevent accelerated pace of disinflation at times of 
declining commodity prices or other positive supply shocks would be probably too 
expansive. In the same vein, monetary policy would risk being too restrictive if it would try 
to avoid any acceleration of inflation as positive supply shocks are reversed.
34  Like many 
other inflation-targeting central banks, the CNB has explicitly recognized that monetary 
policy should not attempt to offset temporary supply shocks that knock disinflation from its 
projected path.  
 
  Third, an opportunistic approach to disinflation could undermine the credibility of an 
inflation targeting framework. By setting medium-term inflation targets, central banks 
attempt to establish a predictable environment that would allow economic agents to plan for 
the future. Even though there could and will be deviations from the target, credible inflation 
targeting would lead the agents to expect that a central bank would do its best to return actual 
inflation to the targeted path. Attempts at opportunistic disinflation could increase the 
uncertainty, because it would make monetary policy less predictable. For example, economic 
agents could expect that central banks would adjust an inflation target upward in case of a 
negative shock as well. 
 
  However, a situation may arise where the path of disinflation has been set incorrectly. 
For example, competitive pressures in the economy, due to liberalization, privatization and a 
more open trade would produce a faster disinflation for a given monetary policy stance that 
originally expected. These favorable supply shocks would be likely to cause inflation to 
undershoot without leading to a decline in output. In this case, maintaining the original 
disinflation target would require an overly expansionary monetary policy, and it would seem 
to be more appropriate to accept in such case a faster than originally intended disinflation.  
                                                 
34 If a positive price shock would be permanent, perhaps as a result of a sudden increase in 
productivity, it would be appropriate to accommodate the effect of such shocks on inflation.    
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This would also likely be politically feasible because the undershoot of the inflation target 
would not be accompanied by output losses. 
 
5.c. Inflation targets and the exchange rate 
 
  In the recent literature on inflation targeting, particularly on inflation targeting in 
emerging market countries, increased attention has been paid to the open-economy aspect of 
inflation targeting (Mishkin, 2000, Mishkin and Savastano, 2001, and Eichengreen, 2001). It 
has been recognized that the large degree of openness of some emerging market economies, 
in combination with specific characteristics of their financial systems, create additional 
challenges for the implementation of inflation targeting. Exchange rate movements affect 
directly domestic inflation, both as a result of external shocks and as a result of monetary 
policy measures. The open economy aspect of inflation targeting plays a prominent role in 
inflation-targeting transition economies as well.  
 
In the initial stage of transition, all three inflation-targeting countries analyzed in this 
paper used a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor to import price stability and bring 
domestic inflation quickly down. The currency peg-based stabilization was quite effective, 
because it allowed them to bring down inflation relatively quickly. The initial monetary 
overhang was eliminated by a one-time increase in price level, rather than by a sustained 
growth in prices, and thus its elimination did not become embedded in inflation expectations.  
However, first Poland, then Czech Republic and finally Hungary abandoned the currency peg 
and moved to more flexible exchange rate arrangements. This has fundamentally changed the 
operation of monetary policy and the operation of the monetary transmission mechanism.  
 
  The importance of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy depends directly on 
the degree of openness of the economy to trade flows, and on the degree of integration into 
international capital markets. The Czech Republic and Hungary are very open economies 
with respect to trade flows. The share of exports plus imports in GDP exceeds 100 percent in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Poland is a more closed economy: the share of exports plus 
imports reaches “only” about 50 percent. Therefore, exchange rate movements in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary will have a more important effect on domestic prices and inflation, 
and thus for inflation targeting. At the same time, all three countries are very open to 
international capital flows, because in preparation for the EU membership, they have largely 
completed capital account liberalization. 
  
There are several reasons why exchange rate movements are important for inflation 
targeting in transition countries (Svensson (2000)). First, exchange rate movements provide 
an additional transmission channel of monetary policy. While in a closed economy, aggregate 
demand and expectation channels dominate, in open economy, the exchange rate channel 
may be the most important one, particularly in the short-run. The exchange rate transmission 
channel operates both directly and indirectly. Changes in nominal exchange rate affect   
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directly the domestic prices of imported final goods, and thus the targeted CPI index.
35 
Indirectly, the exchange-rate channel operates by affecting domestic demand. Changes in real 
exchange rate affect domestic and foreign demand for domestic goods, and thus enhance the 
standard aggregate-demand channel. Second, the exchange rate is one channel through which 
foreign disturbances could be transmitted into the domestic economy. Third, transition 
countries also have a particular concern with their exchange rates because they went to become 
part of the European Union and the euro zone.  Thus they must eventually fix their exchange 
rates to the euro as part of their planned entry into the Economic and Monetary Union and so 
naturally care more about what exchange rate they will convert their currency into the euro upon 
accession.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that emerging market countries and transition economies 
are usually more vulnerable to large exchange rate movements. The reason is the 
underdeveloped capital market in domestic currency and the need to borrow in dollars or 
other foreign currency, except for a very short-term borrowing. This results in open foreign 
exchange positions of banks and/or corporations, and thus increased vulnerability of their 
balance sheets to large exchange rate movements. While large appreciation can make 
domestic producers uncompetitive (both in foreign and domestic markets), large depreciation 
could cause large damage to firms or banks with large open foreign exchange position and 
precipitate a financial crisis of the type described in Mishkin (1996, 1999) 
 
While it is generally recognized that in such open economies like the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, the exchange rate represents both an important channel of monetary 
transmission and an important channel of transmission of external disturbances, it is less 
obvious what are the implications for the treatment of exchange rate in the regime of 
inflation targeting. We can distinguish two approaches to exchange rate: an active and 
passive approach.  In an active approach, the central bank cares about the exchange rate over 
and above its effects on inflation and actively tries to influence the level of the exchange rate.  
In a passive approach, a central bank cares about the exchange rate only to the extent it 
affects aggregate demand and the inflation rate and it does not try to directly manipulate the 




                                                 
35 The CPI index includes prices of both domestic and imported goods. As such, it represents 
a combined measure of domestic inflation and imported inflation. Domestic inflation is also 
affected by changes in prices of imported goods indirectly. Changing the price of imported 
input used for production of domestic goods would affect costs, and - depending on the 
extent of the pass-through - domestic prices. 
36 Again, we can distinguish a more or less active use of this passive approach, depending on 
the time horizon during which the central bank would try to meet inflation target by 
responding to exogenous exchange rate changes.    
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As we have noted, particularly the Czech Republic and Hungary are very open 
economies, and exchange rate will therefore have important effect on inflation and other 
variables. Poland is less open, and exchange rate movements seem to play a less important 
role in monetary policy deliberations. It seems that the NBH is pursuing this active approach, 
as judged from its statements on the role of exchange rate in affecting inflation outcomes. As 
Orlowski (2000) argues, in Hungary, the central bank has focused its monetary policy on 
exchange rate stability, and for this reason, changes in exchange rates have a strong effect on 
inflation. Such a strong effect was not observed in the Czech Republic and Poland. This may 
explain the relatively larger emphasis put by the NBH on the exchange-rate channel of 
monetary policy.  
 
The problem is that too much reliance on the exchange-rate channel of monetary 
transmission carries the risk that a central bank would focus excessively on a short-term 
horizon. In open economies, the exchange-rate channel is not only important, but operates 
very fast, because changes in exchange rate affect directly domestic prices of imported final 
goods, and with longer but still potentially quite short lag prices of domestic goods 
containing imported inputs. This rapid transmission may induce the inflation-targeting 
central bank into too much of a focus on a short-term horizon, and to try to keep actual 
inflation in line with inflation target by orchestrating exchange rate changes. However, 
excessive use of the exchange rate channel could have undesirable consequences. It could 
cause a problem of instrument instability, result in excessive variability of real exchange rate, 
and thus in an increased degree of uncertainty in the economy and higher variability of 
output.
 37 In addition, it runs the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor 
that takes precedence over the inflation target.  For example, as documented in Bernanke et 
al (1999), Israel’s intermediate target of an exchange rate around a crawling peg did slow the 
Bank of Israel’s effort to win support for disinflation and lowering of the inflation targets in 
the early years of its inflation targeting regime.  In addition, an active focus on the exchange 
rate may induce the wrong policy response when a country is faced with real shocks such as 
a terms-of-trade shock.  Two graphic examples of these problems are illustrated by the 
experience in New Zealand and Chile in the late 1990s. 
 
  The short horizon for the inflation target in New Zealand led the Reserve Bank to focus 
on the exchange rate as an indicator of the monetary policy stance because of the direct impact 
of exchange rate movements on inflation.  By early 1997, the Reserve Bank institutionalized 
this focus by adopting as its primary indicator of monetary policy a Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI) similar to that developed by the Bank of Canada.  The idea behind the MCI, which is a 
weighted average of the exchange rate and a short-term interest rate, is that both interest rates 
and exchange rates on average have offsetting impacts on inflation.  When the exchange rate 
falls, this usually leads to higher inflation in the future, and so interest rates need to rise to offset 
the upward pressure on inflation.  However, the offsetting effects of interest rates and exchange 
                                                 
37 This risk seems to be well recognized by the NBH. See National Bank of Hungary (2001), 
pp. 35-36   
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rates on inflation depend on the nature of the shocks to the exchange rates.  If the exchange rate 
depreciation comes from portfolio considerations, then it does lead to higher inflation and needs 
to be offset by an interest rate rise.  However, if the reason for the exchange rate depreciation is 
a real shock such as a negative terms-of-trade shock which decreases the demand for a country's 
exports, then the situation is entirely different.  The negative terms-of-trade shock reduces 
aggregate demand and is thus likely to be deflationary.  The correct interest rate response is then 
a decline in interest rates, not a rise as the MCI suggests. 
 
  With the negative terms-of-trade shock in 1997, the adoption of the MCI in 1997 led to 
exactly the wrong monetary policy response to East Asian crisis.  With depreciation setting in 
after the crisis began in July 1997 after the devaluation of the Thai baht, the MCI began a sharp 
decline, indicating that the Reserve Bank needed to raise interest rates, which it did by over 200 
basis points.  The result was very tight monetary policy, with the overnight cash rate exceeding 
9% by June of 1998.  Because the depreciation was due to a substantial, negative terms-of-trade 
shock which decreased aggregate demand, the tightening of monetary policy, not surprisingly, 
lead to a severe recession and an undershoot of the inflation target range with actual deflation 
occurring in 1999.
38  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand did eventually realize its mistake and 
reversed course, sharply lowering interest rates beginning in July 1998 after the economy had 
entered a recession, but by then it was too late.  It also recognized the problems with using an 
MCI as an indicator of monetary policy and abandoned it in 1999.  Now the Reserve Bank 
operates monetary policy in a more conventional way, using the overnight cash rate as its policy 
instrument, with far less emphasis on the exchange rate in its monetary policy decisions. 
 
  Chile's inflation targeting regime also included a focus on limiting exchange rate 
fluctuations by having an exchange rate band with a crawling peg which was (loosely) tied to 
lagged domestic inflation.  This focus on the exchange rate induced a serious policy mistake in 
1998 because the central bank was afraid it might lose credibility in the face of the financial 
turmoil if it allowed the exchange rate to depreciate after what had taken place in financial 
markets after the East Asian crisis and the Russian meltdown,  Thus instead of easing monetary 
policy in the face of the negative terms-of-trade shock, the central bank raised interest rates 
sharply and even narrowed its exchange rate band.  In hindsight, these decisions were a mistake: 
the inflation target was undershot and the economy entered a recession for the first time in the 
1990s.
39 With this outcome, the central bank came under strong criticism for the first time since 
                                                 
    38The terms-of-trade shock, however, was not the only negative shock the New Zealand 
economy faced during that period.  Its farm sector experienced a severe drought which also 
hurt the economy. Thus, a mistake in monetary policy was not the only source of the recession.  
Bad luck played a role too. See Drew and Orr (1999) and Brash (2000). 
39 Because, given its location in Latin America, Chile’s central bank did have to worry more 
about loss of credibility and also because Chile encountered a sudden stop of capital inflows 
at the time, the ability of the Chilean central bank to pursue countercyclical policy was more 
limited than for the Australian central bank.  However, although lowering interest rates in 
(continued)   
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it had adopted its inflation targeting regime in 1990, weakening support for the independence of 
the central bank and its inflation targeting regime.  During 1999, the central bank did reverse 
course, easing monetary policy by lowering interest rates and allowing the peso to decline. 
 
  The contrast of the experience of New Zealand and Chile during this period with that of 
Australia, another small open economy with an inflation targeting regime is striking.  Prior to 
adoption of their inflation targeting regime in 1994, the Reserve Bank of Australia had adopted 
a policy of allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate without interference, particularly if the source 
of the exchange rate change was a real shock, like a terms-of-trade shock.  Thus when faced 
with the devaluation in Thailand in July 1997, the Reserve Bank recognized that it would face a 
substantial negative terms-of-trade shock because of the large component of its foreign trade 
conducted with the Asian region and that it should not fight the depreciation of the Australian 
dollar that would inevitably result (McFarlane (1999) and Stevens (1999)).   Thus in contrast to 
New Zealand, it immediately lowered the overnight cash rate by 50 basis points to 5% and kept 
it near at this level until the end of 1998, when it was lowered again by another 25 basis points. 
 
  Indeed, the adoption of the inflation targeting regime probably helped the Reserve Bank 
of Australia to be even more aggressive in its easing in response to the East Asian crisis and 
helps explain why its response was so rapid.  The Reserve Bank was able to make clear that 
easing was exactly what inflation targeting called for in order to prevent an undershooting of the 
target, so that the easing was unlikely to have an adverse effect on inflation expectations. The 
outcome of the Reserve Bank's policy actions was extremely favorable.  In contrast to New 
Zealand and Chile, real output growth remained strong throughout this period.  Furthermore, 
there were no negative consequences for inflation despite the substantial depreciation of the 
Australian dollar against the U.S. dollar by close to 20%: inflation remained under control, 
actually falling during this period to end up slightly under the target range of 2 to 3%.   
 
While it would not be desirable if a central bank tried to actively manipulate the 
exchange rate, this does not imply that it should not respond to an exchange rate shock. 
However, whether it should respond or not, and how it should respond, depends on the nature 
of the shock.   As illustrated above, the response to a real shock to the exchange rate such as 
a change in the terms-of-trade should be entirely different from the reaction to a portfolio 
shock.   
 
 The relevant question concerning the transition economies is, what types of shock are 
they likely to face in the period ahead of the EU/EMU membership? And how vulnerable are 
they to large exchange rate movements? How much they should be concerned about 
exchange rate movements for other reasons than the risk that inflation target will not be met?  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
1998 may not have been as attractive an option, the sharp rise in the policy interest rate in 
1998 was clearly a policy mistake.    
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Besides the standard shocks that all open emerging market economies could face, 
transition economies could face specific external shock related to the EU accession:  
specifically, the convergence play.   The convergence play refers to capital inflows to 
accession countries stimulated by the expected behavior of interest rates and exchange rate 
ahead of the EMU accession. Countries that have joined the EMU in the past have 
experienced a sizeable decline in the currency risk premium of their debt, that is, the 
premium to compensate the debt holders for the risk that their currency would loose value. 
The decline in currency risk premium resulted in lower interest rates on their debt 
instruments in local currency, and thus higher price of these instruments. Increased prices 
allowed holders of these instruments to realize capital gains. Therefore, investors could 
reasonably expect that transition countries that have joined the EU will soon join the EMU as 
well, and from the past experience, they could expect a reduction in interest rates on debt 
instruments issued by these countries that would allow them to reap capital gains. In other 
words, these investors have incentive to play on the convergence of interest rates to EMU 
level and invest in fixed-income instruments issued by accession countries. The resulting 
increase in capital inflows and currency appreciation could be viewed as a pure portfolio 
shock that would require interest rate reduction. But reducing interest rates could conflict 
with the inflation target, because it could stimulate domestic demand too much and result in 
faster increase in domestic prices. On the other hand, if monetary policy does not respond, 
the large capital inflow could lead to the standard problems of excessive currency 
appreciation, balance of payments problems, and reversal of capital flow resulting in 
currency depreciation and higher inflation. 
 
Complicating the problem even more is the exposure of accession countries to a 
second shock – in this case a real shock. It has been well documented that as transition 
economies catch up with the more developed EU countries, they experience rapid 
productivity growth, which produces real exchange rate appreciation, either by means of 
nominal appreciation or by means of a higher inflation. In this case, the appreciation of the 
domestic currency should be seen as an equilibrium phenomenon, which is sustainable and 
does not require a monetary policy response. In sum, in the period ahead of the EU/EMU 
membership, accession countries could be exposed to two simultaneous external shocks that 
would tend to produce exchange rate appreciation, but which would call for a different policy 
response. In practice, it could be difficult to disentangle what part of the currency 
appreciation is the result of the portfolio shock and what part results from the real shock. 
Balance of payments data on the size and composition of capital flows, and data on 
productivity growth should provide some indication of relative importance of these two types 
of shocks  
 
The recent experience of the Czech Republic illustrates yet another problem: currency 
appreciation caused by a large inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a result of sale of 
state-owned enterprises to foreign owners. One can argue that currency appreciation resulting 
from the inflow of FDI is the typical real shock that does not call for a monetary policy 
response: the currency appreciates, but FDI inflow results in more investment, better 
management etc., and ultimately in higher productivity, which validated the appreciation of 
the currency. This argument has two problems. First, while currency appreciation will   
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happen always when there is a sale of domestic assets to foreigners for foreign currency, it is 
less sure that the increase in productivity validating the currency appreciation will follow. 
For example, a large part of recent sales consisted of utilities where the potential for 
increasing the competitiveness in export markets is limited. Second, there is a time 
discrepancy between the timing of the currency appreciation (immediately) and the 
productivity increase (later). And third, expectation of currency appreciation as a result of 
sales to foreigners of state-owned assets could itself induce investors to take positions in the 
domestic currency, in order to benefit from the expected appreciation once the privatization 
payment materializes. This would produce a currency appreciation even before the 
privatization-related capital inflow materializes. 
 
All this complicates significantly the task of inflation-targeting central bank. To the 
extent that currency appreciation reflects an equilibrium phenomenon, appreciation of the 
real equilibrium exchange rate, there would be little reason for concern. Such appreciation 
would not threaten economic growth and external equilibrium, and if inflation is still above 
the long-term target, it should help the central bank to bring inflation down. But how much 
should a central bank worry if this real appreciation is too fast and too large? It could result 
in a widening current account deficit and subsequent large exchange rate depreciation, with 
negative effects on inflation. And it could cause problems in corporate sector, because 
adjustment to a fast and large currency appreciation could be more difficult. The standard 
prescription for a central bank dealing with large capital inflows and currency appreciation is 
sterilized intervention: buy foreign currency in foreign exchange market and neutralize 
monetary effects of this intervention by selling bonds. Eventually, this intervention could be 
complemented by interest rate cuts, to reduce the incentive for capital inflows.  
 
But this prescription may be of little help in the circumstances like those in the Czech 
Republic in the 2001-2002. Large capital inflows are mainly in the form of FDI, and not 
attracted by a large interest rate differential. Reducing interest rates is not going to slow 
down FDI inflows. These are interest rate-insensitive. Sterilized intervention would be 
possible, but this policy has its own problems. In order to be effective, it would have to be of 
a very large amount (in the order of several billions of dollars) and it may not even be 
effective at all. Sterilizing such intervention would be quite costly for the central bank. 
40 
 
For these reasons, the CNB has pursued a pragmatic strategy of gradual interest rate 
reduction, combined with occasional foreign exchange market intervention of limited 
magnitude. This intervention has been subsequently sterilized. The CNB recognizes that at 
present, currency appreciation reflects mainly the effect of the FDI inflow, as that it is 
therefore a real shock that the monetary policy has no business of neutralizing. However, the 
speed of the appreciation could be occasionally too fast, and at that point, the CNB feels that 
it could slow down the pace of appreciation by intervening, so that the corporate sector has 
more time to adjust to the trend appreciation. In late 2002, capital inflows related to the 
                                                 
40 Of course, with falling interest rate differential, the costs of sterilization decline as well.    
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convergence play (the portfolio shock) were not a serious issue for the Czech Republic, 
partly because the convergence play and the compression of yield spreads had already taken 
place.
41 Otherwise, the situation would have been even more complicated.  
 
Another reason for not having benign neglect of the exchange rate is emphasized in 
Mishkin (2000) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001).  For the reasons discussed earlier, 
transition countries with a lot of foreign-denominated debt may not be able to afford large 
depreciations of their currencies which can destroy balance sheets and trigger a financial 
crisis.  Central banks in these countries my thus have to smooth “excessive” exchange rate 
fluctuations, but not attempt to keep the exchange rate from reaching its market determined 
level over longer horizons.  The stated rationale for exchange rate smoothing would be 
similar to that for interest-rate smoothing, which is practiced by most central banks, even 
those engaged in inflation targeting:  the policy is not aimed at resisting market-determined 
movements in the exchange rate, but at mitigating potentially destabilizing effects of abrupt 
changes in exchange rates.   
 
The challenges facing the central bank are somewhat different in Hungary. As was 
noted, Hungary still maintains an exchange rate band ±15 percent. In the literature on 
inflation targeting, it is often emphasized that the absence of a second nominal anchor is one 
of the prerequisite of the successful inflation targeting. Pursuing two nominal objectives 
could result in a situation where one objective will need to be given preference over the 
second objective, but without a clear guidance how such conflict would be resolved, this 
could make monetary policy less transparent. 
42 The question arises, to what extent might the 
existence of the ±15 percent exchange rate band in Hungary be considered as a second 
nominal anchor whose attainment could eventually conflict with the inflation target? The 
answer has turned out to be "a lot".  
 
In mid-February, the exchange rate of the forint hovered some 12-13 percent above 
the parity, approaching quickly the upper part of the band. Partly as a result of uncertainty 
related to parliamentary election, the currency weakened somewhat during the Spring and 
Summer, but it began to appreciate again later in 2002. In January 2003, it approached the 
upper end of the band, and speculation about the revaluation of the parity resulted in a sharp 
acceleration of capital inflow that forced the NBH to respond by cutting interest rates by 2 
percentage points and intervening heavily in the foreign exchange market. The NBH is 
reported to have bought more than 5 billion euros, increasing international reserves by 50 
                                                 
41 In fact, at the end of 2002, spreads on domestic currency sovereign bonds compared to the 
benchmark German bonds were negative for all maturities. See Ceska Sporitelna/Erste bank 
(2002). Of course, the question is whether such dramatic compression of yield spreads is 
sustainable. 
42 On the experience with inflation targeting in the presence of nominal exchange rate band 
in Israel, see Leidermann (2000).   
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percent and base money by 70 percent.
43 Even though the NBH began subsequently to 
sterilize this huge injection of liquidity, market participants now assume that maintaining the 
exchange rate band will have a priority over the inflation target and expect inflation in 2003 
to exceed the NBH inflation target.by 5 percentage points..
44 
 
This conflict between the inflation target and exchange rate target need not be a 
unique problem for Hungary. Other accession countries could face this problem once they 
become members of the EU and once they decide to join the ERM2 mechanism that requires 
them to limit exchange rate fluctuations exactly in the same way as Hungary does already 
today, that is, to peg the currency against the euro and allow maximum ±15 percent 
fluctuation around the established parity. Therefore, we now turn to the issue of monetary 
policy implementation in the period after the EU accession and before the EMU accession.  
 
6. Monetary policy within the ERM2 System 
 
The participation in the ERM2 mechanism and subsequently in the EMU is obligatory 
for all new EU members (no opt-out clause available). Albeit, the new EU members do not 
have to join the ERM2 mechanism immediately after the EU entry. Therefore, after joining 
the EU, the new members will have to decide on how quickly to join the ERM2 mechanism 
and thus the EMU, and whether the ERM2 membership would require a modification of the 
inflation targeting framework.  
 
How would monetary policy in the accession countries operate under the ERM2 
regime, and what would be the main nominal anchor of the economy? Formally, the 
monetary policy framework after joining the ERM2 mechanism will be similar to the 
monetary policy framework in Hungary today, where the ±15 percent fluctuation band is 
already in place. But there will be also important differences. First, the actual EMU entry will 
be approaching, which could have important implications for capital flows (convergence 
play) and fiscal policy implementation (need to meet fiscal criteria). Second, breaching the 
target band (its lower side) would have different consequences for Hungary today and for 
accession countries operating within the ERM2 regime. Third, unlike Hungary’s monetary 
policy today, monetary policy and exchange rate of an accession country within the ERM2 
regime will be of common interest to all EMU members, and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) could intervene to help the accession country to keep the exchange rate within the 
band.  
 
The ERM2 fluctuation band will allow rather large exchange rate movements, too 
large to provide a sufficiently firm nominal anchor. For this reason, the inflation target will 
                                                 
43 See J.P. Morgan (2003). 
44 Analysts have interpreted this as an evidence that the NBH is determined to maintain the 
currency band even at the cost of temporary higher inflation. See IMF (2002).    
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likely need to continue to play the role of nominal anchor as it did in Spain before its entry 
into EMU (see Bernanke et al., 1999).  Successful operation of inflation targeting after the 
ERM2 entry should be facilitated by the fact that the process of disinflation is likely to be 
largely completed. Low inflation could reduce, though not fully eliminate, the probability 
that the inflation target would conflict with the commitment to maintain the currency within 
the ERM2.  Still, the possibility of a conflict between the inflation target and the ERM2 
exchange rate band cannot be fully excluded. But it is important to be clear about the nature 
of this risk and how it could be mitigated.  
 
Within a ERM2 framework, two situations could arise where monetary and other 
policies may need to be constraint by the fact that the exchange rate is approaching the lower 
or upper side of the band. One possibility is that the exchange rate would approach the upper 
(appreciated) band, as is now happening in Hungary. In order to prevent breaching the 
permitted fluctuation band, interest rates may need to be reduced to moderate the pressure on 
the currency. But lower interest rates could interfere with the inflation target, because they 
could stimulate domestic demand more than the central bank considers prudent, and could 
produce higher inflationary pressures. However, a strongly appreciating currency would 
simultaneously also act as a mechanism to dampen inflationary pressures, so it is not at all 
obvious that this conflict with inflation target would actually become serious.
45 If reducing 
interest rates would not help, and pressures on the currency to appreciate would persist, 
another option would be to revalue the central parity.
46 This would reduce the burden of 
monetary policy and at the same time introduce a one-time deflationary shock. 
 
A different conflict between inflation target and exchange rate band would arise if 
there is a downward pressure on the currency and if the exchange rate threatens to break 
through the lower (more depreciated) end of the band. Breaching the ERM2 lower target 
band would force the country to start again the ERM2 two-year test, so it could be potentially 
costly. Central banks could react to such a situation by tightening monetary policy and 
raising interest rates. But this response certainly should not conflict necessarily with the 
inflation target. On the contrary, it should be in line with the inflation-targeting policy if the 
reason for downward pressure was too relaxed a policy. And tighter monetary policy would 
also help to mitigate inflationary pressures that may arise from currency depreciation. Tighter 
monetary policy would also be appropriate in the case when the currency depreciates as a 
result of a negative portfolio shock. Higher interest rates should help arrest capital outflow, 
by making domestic currency assets more attractive. But the situation could be more 
                                                 
45 The direct effect of the appreciated exchange rate on inflation will be felt sooner than the 
indirect effect of reduced interest rates on aggregate demand and demand-induced 
acceleration of inflation. 
46 For countries in the ERM2 framework, the ECB would also be expected to help a national 
central bank to sustain the currency inside the fluctuation band, of course, to the extent that 
this does not interfere with the ECB’s price stability objective.   
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complicated when the currency depreciates as a result of negative real shock which at the 
same time reduced aggregate demand for domestic output (domestic or foreign demand). 
Maintaining the currency within the fluctuation band could require a tighter policy stance 
than what would be required if monetary policy were guided only by the inflation target. As a 
result, actual inflation would become lower than the inflation target, and monetary policy 
would further weaken demand and economic activity that was already affected adversely by 
the negative real shock. Under the normal circumstances, this would not be desirable. But 
temporary lower economic activity may be a price worth paying in a situation where the 
alternative would be to violate the Maastricht criterion of two years of successful operation 
within the ERM2 system, thus delaying the EMU entry.  
 
To some extent, fiscal policy could be used to reconcile eventual conflict between 
inflation target and ERM2 band. First, maintaining a fiscal policy stance that would clearly 
indicate authorities’ determination to meet Maastricht criteria of public debt and fiscal deficit 
would reduce the risk of downward pressure on the currency as a result of a negative 
portfolio shock. It would also allow the maintenance of  lower interest rates than if fiscal 
policy were more expansionary, and thus reduce short-term capital inflows. Second, a 
changing fiscal policy stance could be used as a defense against large exchange rate 
movements threatening to breach the ERM2 band. Fiscal policy could be tightened even 
more than what is required by Maastricht criteria in case of downward pressure on the 
currency that would threaten to break the lower side of the band, or – to the extent that 
meeting Maastricht criteria is not threatened – it could be relaxed in case of upward pressure 
on the currency. But in this case, using interest rate policy would be clearly preferable as a 
first line of defense.  
 
The risk of conflict between the inflation target and exchange rate target will depend 
importantly on market expectations of conversion rate of the national currency into the euro. 
If market participants expect that the current market rate will be also the conversion rate, 
there will be less risk of such conflict as the behavior of market participants should actually 
limit the fluctuation of the actual exchange rate. However, widespread market expectation 
that future conversion rate will differ significantly from the current exchange rate could 
result in large and volatile capital flows and swings in actual exchange rate that could 
severely complicate the simultaneous achievement of inflation target (sufficiently low 
inflation to meet the Maastricht criteria) and exchange rate target (keeping the currency 
within the fluctuation band).  
 
 
How should inflation targets be set after the countries will have joined the EU and 
eventually the ERM2 mechanism? The obvious answer is to set the inflation target in such 
way that it would converge to inflation rate estimated to be consistent with the Maastricht 
criterion. Table 6 shows the annual inflation rate in three current EMU members with lowest 
inflation rate in the period 1995-2001. If we add to the average of inflation in three euro area 
best performers and the 1.5 percentage point margin allowed by the Maastricht Treaty, we 
receive the maximum permissible inflation in the accession countries that would be applied if 
they were to join the EMU in that particular year.    
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Table 6.  Lowest inflation rates in EMU countries, 1995-2000 
 
  1995 1996  1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 
Country  A  0.8  0.6  1.2 0.8 0.5  1.7  1.6 
Country  B  1.5  1.3  1.3 0.9 0.6  1.9  2.5 
Country  C  1.7  1.4  1.4 0.9 0.6  2.3  2.5 
Average 
inflation 




2.8  2.6  2.8 2.4 2.1  3.5  3.7 
 
1/ Average inflation in three countries plus 1.5 percentage points. Average inflation rounded 
up. 
Source: United Nations (2002). 
 
If we take the period 1995-2001 as a benchmark, the inflation rate that the accession 
countries would have to reach in order to meet the Maastricht criterion was in the range 2.1-
3.7 percent. In 1998 and 1999, inflation in the euro area countries was particularly low, and it 
would thus seem that reaching the Maastricht objective would have been particularly 
challenging for accession countries at that time. However, we should note that to some 
extent, exceptionally low inflation in the euro area was a part of global tendency of falling 
inflation, which affected the transition economies as well. To the extent that inflation in the 
euro area and in the transition economies waiting to join the EMU moves jointly in response 
to common external shocks like falling commodity prices and weak global economic activity 
accompanied by large excess production capacity and weak pricing power of producers, 
lower permissible inflation does not make it necessary more difficult (does not require a 
tighter monetary policy) to qualify for the EMU.  
 
We can also see that the range of maximum permissible inflation 2.1-3.7 percent is 
broadly in line with the long-term inflation targets in the Czech Republic (2-4 percent), 




In this paper, we have discussed the experience with inflation targeting in the three 
transition economies – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. We have examined the 
circumstances leading to the switch from exchange rate pegs to inflation targeting and the 
modalities of inflation targeting in each of these countries. The short history of inflation 
targeting in these three countries does not yet allow us to draw any definitive conclusions 
about the success or failure of this regime. However, we conclude that inflation targeting in 
transition economies could be implemented reasonably successfully. While the examined 
countries have missed inflation targets often by a large margin, they nevertheless progressed   
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well with disinflation. Still, increased uncertainty prevailing in transition economies makes it 
particularly difficult to predict inflation sufficiently well ahead, as required by a forward-
looking nature of inflation-targeting approach. In view of that, and given the possibility that 
transition countries will be more frequently hit by shocks that could divert inflation from the 
targeted path, misses of inflation targets are more likely than in the more advanced 
economies.  
 
  This does not imply that monetary policy targeting other nominal variables like 
monetary aggregates would make the task of controlling inflation easier. Even though 
inflation targeting in transition economies is more difficult than in advanced economies, it 
could still bring significant benefits. It should be clear, though, that too much focus on hitting 
inflation targets at any price at all times could produce a significant instability of monetary 
policy instruments, damaging economic performance. The focus of inflation-targeting central 
banks should be on the medium-term horizon to ensure that disinflation remains on track and 
that inflation converges to level deemed consistent with price stability. Alongside this 
trajectory, there will inevitably be misses, possibly sizeable. Thus, the onus is on central 
banks’ ability to communicate to the public clearly what are the limits and possibilities of 
inflation targeting in transition economies, and if it happens, to explain credibly and openly 
why inflation targets were missed.  
 
A key lesson from the experience of the inflation targeting transition countries is that 
economic performance will improve and support for the central bank will be higher if central 
banks emphasize avoiding undershoots of the inflation target as much as avoiding 
overshoots.  Undershoots of the inflation targets have resulted in serious economic 
downturns that has eroded support for the central bank in both the Czech Republic and 
Poland.  Also economic performance will be enhanced if inflation targeting central banks in 
transition countries do not engage in active manipulation of the exchange rate.  This seems to 
be less of an issue in the Czech Republic and Poland, but is still a live issue in Hungary.   
 
  A difficult problem for inflation targeting in transition countries is the often stormy 
relationship between the central bank and the government.  This can be alleviated by having 
a direct government involvement in the setting of the inflation target and with a more active 
role of the central bank in communicating with both the government and the public. In 
addition having technocrats appointed as the head of a central bank rather than politicians 
may help in depersonalizing the conduct of monetary policy and increase support for the 
independence of the central bank. 
 
  We have also addressed the future perspective of monetary policy in the transition 
economies. We concluded that even after the EU accession, inflation targeting can remain the 
main pillar of monetary strategy in the three examined accession countries during the time 
before they will join the EMU. Inflation targets would be guided toward meeting the 
Maastricht criteria for inflation, which would require maintenance of inflation at the level 
defined in long-term inflation objectives.  
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  In addition, an important advantage of the inflation targeting regimes in transition 
countries is that the central banks in the countries practicing inflation targeting have been 
learning how to set monetary policy instruments to hit their inflation goals.  Since these 
central banks will have a role in setting monetary policy instruments at the ECB when they 
enter EMU, the monetary policy experience that they have acquired by operating an inflation 
targeting regime, will help them play a more active and positive role in deliberations at the 
ECB.    
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